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UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A GENERATIONAL HISTORY 
ERIC ENGLE· 
Human rights are universal. Not in the sense of being the same positive 
laws, at all times and places, but rather as being aspirational goals, at all 
times and places, and also as containing core values which are indeed 
universal, such as the right to life (no irrational deprivation of life). His-
tories of human rights usually propose that the concept has evolved 
through at least three separate historical waves. This historical account, 
while roughly accurate, must be clarified as a theoretical construction 
which corresponds only partially to the historical reality: the rights of 
women and of non-white persons, in fact, arose relatively late in history. 
With that qualification, however, the historical description is roughly 
accurate, and also explains why we can speak of human rights as "uni-
versal" in a meaningful sense. While human rights are a possible, and 
not necessary, consequence of economic development, there is nothing 
uniquely "western" about human rights. Indeed, all cultures aspire to 
what Aristotle described as "the good life." At least in this sense, human 
rights are universal as all humans are rational animals gifted with speech. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The world has undergone a transformation of international systems, from 
a Westphalian system of nation-states, to a post-Westphalian interna-
tional system based on transnational institutions. This post -Westphalian 
system sees state power devolve to local, or even private, entities and 
* J. D., University of Saint Louis; D.E.A., Paris X (Nanterre) and Paris IT (PantMon-Assas); 
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assigns rights and duties under international law to non-state actors.l 
Because human rights law assigns legal rights and duties under interna-
tionallaw to non-state actors, it is a key feature of the post-Westphalian 
system. In order to determine whether, and how, human rights serve as 
an element in post-Westphalian global governance, we must examine 
first whether human rights are universal. If human rights are, or can be, 
universal then we must examine the historical development of human 
rights. 
II. THE PARADIGM SHIFT: FROM SOVEREIGN STATES TO 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
The paradigm shift from a system which regarded only states as subjects 
of intemationallaw,2 enjoying absolute and inviolable power within their 
own borders, to a system which constrained the absolute power of the 
state, recognized non-state actors as having rights and duties under inter-
national law, and ultimately protected individuals against state and pri-
vate actors3 by recognizing non-state actors as having both rights and 
duties under intemationallaw,4 occurred in several fields simultaneously. 
As a result5 of the horrors of the Second World War,6 the second failure 
of the Westphalian system to maintain global peace in as many genera-
tions, individuals and organisations were tried for crimes under interna-
tional law:7 crimes against peace, crimes against humanityS and war 
crimes9 at the Nuremberg Trials. \0 The defences raised by the accused -
1. The "shift in sovereignty accompanying globalisation has meant that non-state actors are 
more involved than ever in issues relating to human rights." Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human 
Rights In A Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT·L. COMPo L. REv. 273, 273 (2002) available at: 
<http://www.bc.edulbc_orglavp/law/lwsch/joumalslbciclrI25_2I06_TXT.htm>. 
2. Individuals and non-state actors in the Westphalian system were considered mere "objects" 
of international law. ANTONIO CASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORW, 14 (Polity Press 
1990). 
3. International Human Rights protects individuals against state action and even against 
private action. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY 
LAW, 98 (Oxford: Clarendon 1989). 
4. International Human Rights law assigns rights and even duties to individuals. Id. at 101. 
5. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection Of The Rights Of Individuals 
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1982). 
6. ANTONIO CASSESE, supra note 2, at 15 (arguing that the second world war inaugurated a 
radical reconceptualization of international law). 
7. Robert D. Sloane, The Changing Face Of Recognition In International Law: A Case Study 
Of Tibet, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 107,144 (2002) (human rights documents founded sprang from 
the ruins of the Second World War). 
8. For a discussion of contemporary issues in crimes against humanity see: Simon Chester-
man, An Altogether Different Order: Defining The Elements Of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DUKE 
J. OFCOMP. & INT'L L. 307 (2000) available at: 
<http://www.law.duke.edulshelllcite.pl?IO+Duke+J.+Comp.+&+Int.I+L.+307>. 
9. Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 11. 
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sovereign immunity, official immunity, 11 nullum crimen sine lege,12 re-
spondeat superior, 13 compulsionl4 and one's duty to obeylS the orders of a 
lawfully appointed superiorl6 - were all, for various reasons, rejected. 
Knowingly or not, however, in assigning a legal duty to individuals to 
obey certain norms entailing an obligation erga omnes l7 - to disobey, 
under certain circumstances, the command of the sovereign - the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal broke from the Westphalian model. 
Just as noteworthy as the break from the Westphalian system, the Tribu-
nal also was forced to recognize universal principles of natural justice. IS 
The non-retroactivity of law (no ex post facto criminal laws) was a prin-
ciple of law since at least the French Declaration des Droits de 
l'Homme,19 although Hobbes did mention the principle earlier.20 These 
breaches of the enlightenment principle of legality, crime would be de-
fined only prior to its commission, and the Westphalian principle of the 
hermetic nature of sovereignty, might have been regarded as particular 
exceptions reSUlting from unique circumstances. Philosophically how-
ever they could only be justified via a theory of natural law:21 the war 
crimes were such a basic, and self-evident, violation of the inherent dig-
10. Charter Of The International Military Tribunal August 8, 1945, art. 6, [hereinafter IMT] 
available at: <http://www.yale.eduJIawweb/avalonlimtJproclimtconst.htm>. Nuremberg in German 
is Niirnberg. 
11. IMT art. 7. 
12. Paul Feuerbach, Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland gueltigen peinlichen Rechts (1st 
ed. 1801) cited in: The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Defence Submission 2, available at: 
<http://www .nizkor.orglhweb/peopleleleichmann-adolf/transcriptslSessionslDefence-Submission-
02-0 I.html>. 
13. Jeanne L. Bakker, The Defense Of Obedience To Superior Orders: The Mens Rea Re-
quirement, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 57 (1989). 
14. [d. at 62. 
15. [d. at 58. 
16. IMT art. 8. This is perhaps the most counterintuitive problem posed by the Nuremberg 
principles: the duty of an individual to disobey the sovereign under international law is incongruent 
with the rationale of the Westphalian system. Once a duty was imposed on individuals to disobey 
the orders of the sovereign, the argument that only the sovereign should be the intermediary of the 
individual in the international arena becomes illogical. How can one be required at once to disobey 
the sovereign and expected to rely on that sovereign for protection internationally? By implication, 
Nuremberg ended the monopoly of the state as representative of the individual internationally. 
17. Alfred P. Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens, and Offenses Erga Omnes, 35 N. ENG. LAw 
REv. 265, 267 (2001) available at: <http://www.nesl.eduJIawrevNoI35/35-2/rubin.pdf>. 
18. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 19, One Hundred And Eighty-Seventh Day, Friday, 26 
July 1946 available at: <http://www.yale.eduJIawweb/avalonlimtJproc/07-26-46.htm>. 
19. Declaration des droits de l'homme, art. 8. 
20. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651), chs. XXVII-XXVIII. 
21. "Lex mala, lex nulla" - an evil law is no law at all. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA, (2d Ed., 1920) citing Augustine "that which is not just seems to be no law at all" (De 
Lib. Arb. i, 5) available at: <http://www.newadvent.orglsummal209502.htm>. 
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nity of humans that they were implicitly prohibited under ius naturale. 22 
Thus, in order to escape accusations of violating the principle nullum 
crimen, nulla poena, sine praevia lege,23 the court had to acknowledge 
arguments based on a theory of universal law - natural justice. 
The courts at Nuremberg and in Eichmann thus could not escape from 
the idea of morality. Nor could they escape from the idea that all that is 
moral, is also lawful (and possibly even from the idea that all that is im-
moral, is also unlawful - because the defense of many of the criminals 
was that they were following orders). And this, despite the fact that until 
then the entire tendency of legal theory, at least since the year 1880, 
tended toward positivism, with theories of natural law dismissed as pre-
scientific, wishful thinking or even naivete. However, looking at legisla-
tion, clearly much immorality is perfectly legal. This aporime explains 
why these cases are problematic, and why natural law will continue to 
haunt positivism. The only way out of this dilemma is to recognize law 
is about force; justice is about morality. Positivism and natural law can, 
in fact, be linked (as Hobbes and Aristotle did)24 by distinguishing natu-
rallaw (lex naturale)25 from natural justice. Justice is about morality, and 
an unjust law, while positively obligatory, is not legally binding - as 
Cicero,26 Aquinas,27 and many others discussed. Only through distin-
22. For example, when Eichmann was tried for "crimes against the Jewish people," the trial 
court's judgement (not necessarily the appeal!) relies on Blackstone arguing that mala in se can be 
prohibited ex post, because they are violations of natural law and are attempts to make a question-
able distinction between ex post facto and retroactive laws. In contrast, the Appellate judgment 
relies on the positivist Kelsen. "There is no rule of general customary international law forbidding 
the enactment of norms with retrospective force, so called ex post facto law." HANS KELSEN, PEACE 
THROUGH LAW, 87 (1944). The judgement also relied on Stone, "[tJhere is clearly no principle of 
international law embodying the maxim against retroactivity of criminal law." JULIUS STONE, 
LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, 369 (1959). The court even points out: " .. .it is 
hardly necessary to invoke natural law to condemn the mass slaughter of helpless human beings. 
Murder is generally taken to be a crime in positive intemationallaw." FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY, 
316 (Columbia University Press, 4th ed.). Despite these positivist references the Israeli supreme 
court still felt compelled to contradict its positivism and rely, finally, on: "universal moral values and 
humanitarian principles which are at the root of the systems of criminal law adopted by civilised 
nations." Israel v. Eichmann, Criminal Case No. 40/61 (district court) available at: 
<http://www.nizkor.orglhweb/peopleleleichmann-adolf/transcriptslJudgmentlJudgment-OOI.html>; 
Israel v. Eichmann (S. Ct.) available at: <http://www.nizkor.orglhweb/peopleleleichmann-
adolf/transcriptsl Appeal! Appeal-Session-07 -0 I.htm!>. 
23. James Popple, The Right to Protection from Retroactive Criminal Law, 13 CRIM. L. JNL. 4, 
251-62 (1989); 2 AUSTRALASIAN LAW STUDENTS' ASSOC'N J., 5-18 (1989) available at: 
<http://cs.anu.edu.aul-James.Popplelpublicationslarticles/retroactive/2.shtml>. 
24. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book V. 
25. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XN, para. 3. Hobbes' lex naturalis is the law of self-
preservation, implicitly via the use of force if necessary. 
26. CICERO, THE REpUBLIC at lI/, XXII (Loeb Classical Library, 1950), available at: 
<http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/repub.shtmi> (lat.). 
27. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, SECUNDA SECUNDAE PARTIS §57 (Right), avail-
able at: <http://www.newadvent.orglsumma/3.htm>. 
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guishing the two, can the supposed dichotomy between positivism and 
natural law be resolved.28 
Nuremberg was not only remarkable because it broke from the West-
phalian model and raised serious theoretical implications, it was also 
problematic. The victorious powers had also committed acts of dubious 
legality - mass aerial bombardment of civilian populations,29 the use of 
chemical weapons (specifically, white phosphorous) and even atomic 
bombardment.30 The shadow of Nuremberg points an accusing finger at 
those who judged, but were not themselves judged.31 Perhaps for this 
reason (i.e. the need to provide legitimacy to the post-war order and the 
decisions at Nuremberg), and certainly because of the depth of devasta-
tion, the international legal system was irrevocably changed through the 
establishment of limitations on sovereign power: states would no longer 
have the right to launch wars of aggression, and could only resort to 
force in self-defense.32 An international governing body, the United Na-
tions, with the power to approve or disapprove of the use of force,33 arose 
like a Phoenix out of the ashes of the failed League of Nations, and dev-
astated continents. 
Ultimately the post-war system outlawed wars of aggression;34 recog-
nized a right to humanitarian assistance35 and a right of humanitarian 
28. See, Eric Engle, Critical Legal Studies in America (2000) available at: 
<http://www.gradnet.de/altlpom02.archives/pom02.papers/engleOO.hUn>. 
29. The League of Nations had already condemned aerial bombardment of civilians: Protection 
of Civilian Populations Against Bombing From The Air In Case Of War, Unanimous resolution of 
the League of Nations Assembly, Sept. 30, 1938, available at: 
<http://lessons.ctaponline.orgl-murphy_s!Nuclearffext%20Evidence/international_law_on_the_bo 
mbing.htIn>. 
30. The use or threat to use nuclear weapons is probably a war crime and/or a crime against 
humanity. See, On the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of 
Justice, The Hague, 8 July 1996; Resolution On Nuclear Weapons United Nations, November 24, 
1961, General Assembly Resolution 1653. 
31. See, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin, supra note 17, at 280. "[N]o such tribunal existed outside of 
various victors' tribunals (like the post-WWIl allied tribunals at Nuremberg, Tokyo and elsewhere), 
which did not apply the same 'law' to the victors' leaders that they applied to the leaders of the 
vanquished state or forces." 
32. "Article 2(4) of the UN Charter comprehensively prohibits the use of force, thereby sur-
passing the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact's prohibition of going to war as a political means." Jost Del-
bruck, A More Effective International Law Or A New "World Law"? - Some Aspects Of The Devel-
opment Of International Law In A Changing International System, 68 IND. L.J. 705,707-708 (1993). 
33. Charter of the United Nations, ch. VII, art. 41, available at: 
<http://www.un.orglaboutunlcharter/>. 
34. Jost Delbruck argues that in the post-cold war era the definition of "aggression" is becom-
ing broader. See, Jost Delbruck, supra note 32, at 708. 
35. Humanitarian assistance appears undefined in international law. For attempts at definitions 
see, Noelle Quenivet, Humanitarian assistance: a right or a policy?, J. HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE (June, 2000), at: <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a030.htIn> and also, Songiee Song, NGOs 
and UN System in Humanitarian Assistance in War Zones: Focusing on Somalia and Rwanda, 
(M.A. thesis, 2000) at: <http://gias.snu.ac.kr/i/i-thesisli-0008thesis/sisong.pdf>. In the U.S., domes-
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intervention;36 accorded rights and duties to non-state actors, including 
non-governmental organisations (NGOS);37 recognized individual and 
corporate liability in crime, or in tort, under international human rights 
law; and guaranteed human rights in international declarations, resolu-
tions, and conventions. At the same time, universal38 jurisdiction ex-
panded.39 State powers at the national level have simultaneously 1) de-
volved "downward" to regional, provincial, and municipal entities; 2) 
transferred "upward" to supra-national economic and political organisa-
tions; and 3) privatised "outward" to corporations. Meanwhile, individu-
als and other non-state actors increasingly are accorded rights and duties 
under international law. All of these changes have imposed real limits 
on, and expose the greatly reduced role of, the, formerly, absolute sover-
eign power of ''The State." 
Any of these facts alone might be seen as mere derogations from the 
Westphalian system. But, taken together, it is similar to the problem of 
the ship of Theseus: if enough planks are replaced in Theseus' ship (here 
the Westphalian system), is it still his ship[iO The author is of the opin-
ion that the rise of continental and global free-trading regimes such as 
MERCOSUR, the E.U., the Andean Pact, NAFTA, ASEAN, coupled 
tic law humanitarian assistance is defined (22 U.S.C. § 2296 (b)(2» as "assistance to meet humani-
tarian needs, including needs for food, medicine, medical supplies and equipment, education, and 
clothing." Available at: 
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecodeluscodesl22/chapters/32/subchapters/ilpartslxiilsections/sect 
ion_2296.html>. 
36. "Humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or inter-
national organisation primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from 
widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights." Tania Voon, Closing The Gap 
Between Legitimacy And Legality Of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons From East Timor And 
Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 31, 34 (2002). Some historical precedents exist even 
prior to the world wars for the right of humanitarian intervention in order to protect human rights. 
See Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 5. 
37. The extent ofNGO's appears to be growing, and NGOs are even implicated in the question 
of whether states have a right of intervention to provide humanitarian assistance. See C. STAHN, 
NGO's AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING, 61 ZaORV 379 (2003). 
38. William C. Plouffe, Sovereignty In The "New World Order": The Once And Future Posi-
tion Of The United States, A Merlinesque Task Of Quasi-Legal Definition, 4 TuLSA J. COMPo & INT'L 
L. 49, 54 (1996). Recognizing at least five bases for jurisdiction under international law "(1) the 
territorial principle, (2) the nationality principle, (3) the protective principle, (4) the passive person-
ality principle, and (5) the universality principle." 
39. But see: D. Bowell, Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Re-
sources, in THE STRUCfURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
DOCTRINE AND THEORY (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston eds., (1986». Acknowledges the existence of 
universal jurisdiction under the passive and active personality principle and the protective principle 
(560-562), but argues that while universal jurisdiction exists in cases of piracy and air piracy, that 
(despite Eichmann and the 1949 Geneva Conventions!) universal jurisdiction does not, or should 
not, exist as to war crimes, terrorism, or apartheid (563-564). 
40. The philosophical problem of the ship of Theseus is not "which ship belongs to Theseus." 
Instead it is, "what do we mean by identity?" (or even, "what do we mean by posession?"). See, e.g., 
Theseus, (2003) at: <http://www.angelfire.com/galJaimeisms/tst.html>. 
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with global trading regimes (WTO, GATS and TRIPS), each featuring 
binding adjudication and governance mechanisms, implies the present 
system is a post-Westphalian system. States are no longer primary ac-
tors, but rather one actor among many others. The post-Westphalian 
system could be compared, speaking very approximately, to the Holy 
Roman Empire or perhaps even the Austro-Hungarian Empire; several 
different peoples and religions subject to nominal political entities (the 
E.U., MERCOSUR, the U.N.) which guarantee liberal trade and protect 
minonttes. However, the contemporary multinational system is not 
merely continental - it is global. Today, international law, led by the 
U.N., recognizes, and to some extent even guarantees, human rights. 
What caused this paradigm shift? How were these new rights - now 
inherent in individuals and groups, not in states - grounded? 
A. ELABORATION OF GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS: OPINIO JURIS 
Historically, the legal imputation to, and acquisition of rights by, indi-
viduals in the post-war world, can be analyzed as having been driven by 
trans-national and conventional global systems.41 Because human rights 
claim to be universal, and because individual human rights most seri-
ously challenge the assumptions of the Westphalian system, our primary 
focus will be on the discovery of individual rights at the global level. In 
fact, trans-national efforts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, 
have been even more successful at imputing rights to individuals than 
global efforts. However, the claim that the post-Westphalian order im-
putes legal rights to individuals can be best demonstrated by analysing 
the claim at its boldest, and weakest, point - the creation of weak, but 
universal, human rights protections under the aegis of the U.N. and re-
gional convention systems. 
One feature of the post-Westphalian world is the rise of a series of inter-
locking U.N. conventions based on universal norms,42 which this author 
refers to as "the U.N. convention system."43 These conventions, which 
can also be found at the regional level, whether continental44 or herni-
spheric,45 are promulgated by international organizations seeking to pro-
41. ANTONIO CASSESE, supra note 2, at 22. 
42. Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, 
Morals 69, 136 (Oxford Vniv. Press, 2d ed., 2000). 
43. Philip Alston, Final report on enhancing the long-term effectiveness of the United Nations 
human rights treaty system, Geneva: UN, (1997). 
44. [European] Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms, 
213, available at: <http://heiwww.unige.eh!humanrts/instreelzI7euroco.html>. 
45. For example, the [Inter] American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 
36, 1144 V.N.T.S. 123, entered into force July 18, 1978, available at: 
<http://heiwww.unige.ch!humanrtsloasinstr/zoas3con.htm>. 
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tect human rights and guarantee freedom of commerce. These organiza-
tion promulgate these conventions because liberal economic theory pos-
tulates that free trade increases prosperity and reduces the likelihood of 
war by de-linking economy and territory. 
The transformation of the Westphalian system has occurred via a func-
tionalist proliferation of treaties,46 which are either general or specific as 
to their subject matter, are either regional47 or global4s in jurisdiction, and 
which aspire to attract voluntary, universal membership.49 The conven-
tion system is, in fact, widely adhered to: "three-quarters or more of 
United Nations member states have ratified five of the six human rights 
treaties."50 These networks of norms have been constantly expanding and 
are interlocking, i.e. they are mutually reinforcing.51 
The various human rights treaties usually feature enforcement mecha-
nisms including, generally, an expert monitoring body with power to 
hear petitions from state parties, and sometimes even from individuals52 
or other non-state actors.53 These usually include an obligation to submit 
reports54 to a committee,55 and a right (sometimes optionalY6 of states 
against other states and, possibly, individual rights of action. For exam-
ple, the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination and the Committee against Torture, all offer indi-
46. Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 213, 216-217 
(2002) (notes proliferation in treaties and that the proliferation of treaties is accompanied by the rise 
in international organizations). 
47. Id. at 217-218 (nearly half of all multilateral treaties developed by the U.N.). 
48. Elsa Starnatopoulou, The Development Of United Nations Mechanisms For The Protection 
And Promotion Of Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 687, 688-689 (1998). Describes the 
global U.N. convention system - CEDAW, CAT, ICCPR, CESCR, and CERD. 
49. Jose E. Alvarez, supra note 46, at 220 (describes formative processes of multilateral trea-
ties). 
50. Caroline Dommen, The U.N. Human Rights Regime: Is It Effective? 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 
PROC. 460, 466 (1997). (Remarks By Anne F. Bayefsky). 
51. Id. at 462-463. (Remarks by Thomas Buergenthal, U.N. human rights system of web of 
treaties, meachanisms and instruments seeking to "ratchet-up" human rights). 
52. The fact that individuals have rights and duties under international law is so clear that the 
more interesting question is whether such rights and duties can be implied in the treaty or must be 
expressly stated. See Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side Of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights 
Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51, 51-52 (1992). Given the state practice of recognizing rights and 
duties inhering in individuals, and the fact that treaties are to be construed liberally, the better argu-
ment is that it is possible to imply an individual right or duty in the terms of a treaty. 
53. Monica Pinto, Fragmentation Or Unification Among International Institutions: Human 
Rights Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 833, 833 (1999). 
54. E.g., ICCPR, art. 40, available at: <http://www.unhchr.chlhtmIlmenu31b/a_ccpr.htm>. 
55. E.g. ICCPR, art. 28, available at: <http://www.unhchr.chlhtrnllmenu31b/a_ccpr.htm>. 
56. E.g., ICCPR, art. 41, available at: <http://www.unhchr.chlhtrnllmenu31b/a_ccpr.htm>. 
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vidual complaint procedures.57 However, these conventions are often 
subject to reservations.58 
Nevertheless, this process can be properly called the constitutionalization 
of a new body of international law, international human rights law, with 
very different presumptions and goals than the now defunct Westphalian 
system. 59 This system,60 an interlocking network of conventions, thus 
contributes to the post-Westphalian system of global governance.61 For 
example, the function of the International Bill of Rights - i.e. the UDHR, 
the ICCPR and the CESCR - is to change the behavior of states.62 The 
supplementary treaties on race (Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination - CERD),63 gender (Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women - CEDAW)64 and children,65 
similarly seek to change the behavior of states. National courts regard 
the decisions, for example of the HRC, as at least persuasive evidence66 
of law,67 and should, and sometimes do, interpret domestic law as neces-
sarily consistent with international obligations.68 
57. Caroline Dommen, supra note 50, at 463. (Remarks by Thomas Buergenthal). 
58. U.S. practice in making extensive reservations to treaties is often criticised. See. e.g .• 
Frederic L. Kirgis. Reservations to Treaties and United States Practice, ASIL INSIGHTS (May. 2003) 
at: <http://www.asil.orglinsightslinsighI05.hlm>. 
59. Nigel David White, The United Nations System: Conference. Contract Or Constitutional 
Order? 4 SING. J.INT'L & COMPo L. 281. 298 (2000). 
60. Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm Of Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility. 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1431, 1449 (2002) (describes U.N. convention system as democratic 
global governance). 
61. Jose E. Alvarez, supra note 46, at 232-233 (describes world as evolving toward institutions 
and processes of global governance). 
62. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference? III YALE L.J. 1935, 
1957-1958 (2002) (describes processes of multilateral treaty making). 
63. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Mar. 
7, 1966.660 U.N.T.S. 195; available at: 
<http://www.tufts.eduldepartrnentslfletcher/multiltextsIBH490.txt>. 
64. Available at: <http://www.hrweb.orgllegaVcdw.html>. 
65. Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law. Gender. And The Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARv. 
HUM. RTS. J. 133. 134 (2002). 
66. E.C.H.R. cited by an Indian court as evidence of a general principle of law: Hussainara 
Khatoon and Others v. Home Secretary. State of Bihar (1980), I SCC 81 (Indian Supreme Court). 
But see, Jean v. Nelson. 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984). affd on other grounds 105 S. Ct. 2992 
(1985). (Custom not found in conventions, resolutions); Tel Oren v. libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 
2d 774 (DC Cir. 1984), cen. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). Cf Fernandez Roque v. Smith. 622 F. 
Supp. 887 (NO Ga. 1985) modified sub nom. Fernandez-Roque v. Meese. 781 F.2d. 1450 (11th Cir. 
1986). See also. Ishtyaq v. Nelson. 627 F. Supp. 13 (BDNY 1983) and Soroa-Gonzalez v. Civiletti. 
515 F. Supp. 1049 (NO Ga. 1981); THEODOR MERON. supra note 3, at 126. 
67. Caroline Dommen. supra note 50. at 463. (Remarks by Thomas Buergenthal). 
68. See. e.g .• Ram Chand Birdi v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1975) 61 INT'L L. REP. 
(UKCA) 250 (1981). Holding that courts must interpret national laws to be consistent with prior 
international laws because the national legislature is presumed to legislate with international obliga-
tions in mind. 
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Thus, the implementation of human rights69 by the U.N. is one more 
functionalist success story. Rather than trying to achieve the immedi-
ately unattainable, the U.N. has consistently, and practically, chosen to 
achieve the possible - all the while seeking to expand the reach of the 
laws it has sponsored70 and to ultimately achieve goals which at the time 
of promulgation were unattainable. Compare this aspect of functional-
ism to a ratchet: the U.N. has actively pushed incrementally in a single 
direction to expand and extend human rights71 while successfully resist-
ing any reversionary efforts to restrict or push back those human rights 
protections already achieved. Thus, while human rights are still far from 
secure, the, admittedly limited, protection human rights offer is con-
stantly, albeit gradually, expanding.72 
While all the above is true, serious limitations to this system still exist. 
For example, the conventions generally permit reservations73 and en-
forcement protocols are usually optional.74 There are practical reasons 
for this, mainly to ensure that as many states as possible75 will partici-
pate.76 Permitting reservations and making enforcement protocols op-
tional is defensible because it permits the formation of the opinio juris77 
69. Jennifer A. Downs, A Healthy And Ecologically Balanced Environment: An Argument For 
A Third Generation Right, 3 DUKE 1. COMPo & INT'L L. 351,361 (1993). Acceptance of human 
rights into international law occurred via acceptance of UDHR as customary international law, and 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and of the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights. 
70. E.g., art. 2 of the ICESCR links human rights protection to economic development and 
imposes a duty on states to augment the protection of human rights as the state's economic capacity 
increases. 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realisation of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, in-
cluding particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
Available at: <hnp://www.unhchr.chlhtm1lmenu31b/a3escr.htm>. 
71. E.g., art. 12 of the ICESCR states, "I. [t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health." Thus, as technology improves, so does the obligation of the state. Available at: 
<http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu31b/a_cescr.htm>. 
72. The obligation of states under the conventions is clear - not merely guaranteeing existing 
human rights but also affirmatively seeking to augment the level of protection. E.g., art. 13 of the 
ICESCR mandates the progressive introduction of free public higher education, not merely primary 
and secondary education, but also university and technical training. Available at: 
<http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu31b/a3escr.htm>. 
73. With exceptions, e.g., the Optional Protocol to CEDAW specifically prohibits reservations 
to the protocol. Art. 17, CEDAW Op. Prot. (G.A. res. 54/4, annex, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) 
at 5, U.N. Doc. N54/49 (Vol. I) (2000). 
74. See. e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Optional 
Protocol, 999 U.N.T.S. 302. 
75. Jennifer A. Downs, supra note 69 (ICESCR and ICCCPR are binding law). 
76. Monica Pinto, supra note 53, at 836. 
77. Opinio juris is found in "verbal statements of governmental representatives to international 
organisations, in the content of [U.N.] resolutions, declarations, and other normative instruments 
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needed to create customary78 and binding international law,79 of which 
the conventions80 are evidence. 
In practical terms, how can the U.N. be said to have "ratcheted" human 
rights up? To speak of the "crystallisation" of human rights law is to 
describe this process. International human rights law often finds its ori-
gin as universal ideals - not as binding law. These ideals, however, are 
expressed in non-binding, universal instruments.81 This is not merely 
hypocritical82 whitewash of brutal realities: universal, non-binding in-
struments are promulgated in order to form the opinio juris of an interna-
tional custom,83 which may then ripen into customary law.84 Further, the 
ideals presented in human rights declarations, resolutions and conven-
tions represent moral goals and standards which cannot be resisted be-
cause of their universal appeal and the legitimising power of democracy. 
Democracy, or at least popular consent, is theoretically the legitimating 
norm85 sine qua non of almost all regimes. Even the undemocratic are 
attracted to universalist human rights ideals. Thus, in practice, interna-
tional human rights norms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 86 are identified in hortatory declarations by the U.N. These hor-
tatory declarations "merely" identify goals - of the entire global commu-
nity. 
adopted by such organisations, and in the consent of states to such instruments." THEODOR MERON, 
supra note 3, at 42, citing Nicaraguan (Nicaragua v. U.S.) merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14 (Judgement of 
27 June). 
78. It must be remembered that customary law is binding upon states, even those states which 
regard treaties as non-self executing. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.) supra note 77. 
79. N.b.: customary international law is, unlike treaty law, regarded by the United States as 
self-executing. This also explains the vitality of customary international law even in this era of 
conventional systems such as the WTO and UN. Jordan 1. Paus!, Customary International Law And 
Human Rights Treaties Are Law Of The United States, 20 MICH. J.INT'L L. 301,336 (1999). 
80. Opinio juris can arise out of U.N. General Assembly resolutions and Conventions. 
MERON, supra note 3, at 86. 
81. Thus the conventions are open to all U.N. member states, state parties to the statute of the 
ICJ, and any other state the General Assembly of the U.N. invites. E.g. ICCPR, art. 48 and ICESCR, 
art. 26, available at: <http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu31b/a_cescr.htm>. 
82. There is, of course, plenty of hypocrisy in international relations. See, e.g., GABE V ARGES, 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER LEGAL DEBATE, I (Peter Lang, Frankfurt 1983). 
83. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG/Den.; FRG Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, 44 
(Judgment of 20 Feb.) stated that international law defines custom as a universal or near universal 
state practice coupled with a sense of legal obligation. 
84. But Bin Cheng, argues against the transformationist thesis that international custom can be 
constituted from international conventions. Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Prac-
tice in a Divided World, in THE STRUCfURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 515 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston eds., 1986). 
85. The right to democracy is also guaranteed in the U.N. convention system. Thus, e.g. art. 
21, art 25 (a) ICCPR, art. I ICESCR, art. 4ICESCR. 
86. Richard Klein, Cultural Relativism, Economic Development And International Human 
Rights In The Asian Context, 9 TOURO INT'L L. REv. 1,2 (2001) (rise of human rights a conscious 
rejection of the former state system due to world wars). 
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Paradoxically, however, the non-binding human rights, goals and ideals 
thus constitute opinio juris,87 one element of customary law.88 States 
believe that they "ought" to observe human rights; creating the sense of 
obligation required for the opinio juris needed to form customary inter-
nationallaw,89 which, in turn, is evidenced by states adhering or acceding 
to the instruments, and even by their silence in the face of universal 
adoption of such instruments.9o 
States at this stage could present objections to human rights. They could 
present themselves as persistent objectors,91 and thus avoid being the 
subject of any customary law later developing out of those norms. How-
ever, to be persistent objectors, states must manifest dissent to the inter-
national custom openly, notoriously and objectively.92 No state can do 
this and retain credibility and legitimacy in the international arena. No 
state wishes to go on record as favouring torture. No state wishes to af-
firm the inferior status of women. No state will admit to being racist -
because to do so would be to de-legitimate that state, both before its own 
people, and before the international community. The idea of human 
rights is, in fact, so attractive, that it is literally impossible for all but the 
most tyrannical of states to deny their existence and retain credibility as 
legitimate expressions of popular Will.93 Thus there are rarely, if ever, 
persistent objectors to the normative goals of the hortatory declarations 
of human rights. 
Human rights are also attractive because of practical reasons. The even-
tuality that a binding norm might arise out of a non-binding one seems so 
remote that states did not, and do not, object to hortatory, non-binding 
87. Some argue, erroneously, that opinio is logically the only element needed to constitute 
international custom. See Bin Cheng, supra note 84, at 530-531. 
88. Other elements than opinio juris and practice may be needed to form customary interna-
tionallaw. In describing national customary law, the eminent Judge Blackstone noted that custom 
must: "(I) have been 'used so long, that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary;' (2) be 
continued without interruption; (3) be peaceably acquiesced (4) be reasonable; (5) be certain in its 
terms; (6) be accepted as compulsory; and (7) be consistent with other customs." Jo Lynn Slama, 
Opinio Juris In Customary IntemationalLaw, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 610 (1990). 
89. Ivan Poullaos, The Nature Of The Beast: Using The Alien Tort Claims Act To Combat 
International Human Rights Violations, 80 WASH. u. L.Q. 327, 333 (2002) (custom with opinio juris 
can ripen from mere practice into international customary law). 
90. Customary law can evolve "without express universal consent." Jo Lynn Slama, supra 
note 88, at 626. 
91. Custom may arise out of acquiescence by non-signatories, i.e. absence of objecti ve objec-
tion. THEODOR MERON, supra note 3, at 89. 
92. The principle of the "persistent objector" in international law provides that a state is not 
bound to a rule of customary law where it has expressly and persistently objected to that rule. Jo 
Lynn Slama, supra note 88, at 627. 
93. Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony And International Law Speaking Law To Power: 
Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, And The New International Order, 1 CHI. J. 00'1. L. 1, 12 
(2000) (all modem states combine democracy and human rights). 
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human rights goals. Because states dare not call into question their own 
legitimacy; because the remote prospect of future obligation is so slight 
as compared to the cost of risking legitimacy; and even for reasons of 
power politics, states cannot, and do not, attack the legitimacy of human 
rights and thus rarely, if ever, can be seen as persistent objectors. 
States support human rights not merely for defensive legitimation pur-
poses but also for the instrumentalist reasons of Realpolitik.94 Human 
rights can be an instrument of foreign policy.95 The state that supports 
human rights has a weapon. That weapon may be weak. It may be read-
ily discarded. However, the weapon of human rights can be wielded in 
negotiations which appear, at first glance, to have nothing to do with 
human rights or in surprising96 contexts.97 The U.S.-Chinese trade rela-
tions is but one example where, even if human rights are only a pretext 
for substantive goals, they are, nevertheless, supported and defended.98 
No state wishes to renounce a potential tool in its diplomatic toolkit. The 
cost of observing most human rights is relatively low. Consequently, 
states observe human rights and even claim to promulgate them for rea-
sons of Realpolitik.99 Conversely, states do not reject human rights 
norms, at least as merely hortatory goals, because to do so would deny 
them the ability to criticize other states credibly when those other states 
violate human rights. However, the Realpolitik of human rights can only 
partly validate the realist position because a realist analysis would have 
to ignore the role of the U.N., ignoring the facts. Regardless of methodo-
logical disputes, human rights have acquired the opinio juris needed to 
ripen into customary law for the above-mentioned reasons. 1OO The first 
step in the evolution of a binding legal norm from non-binding political 
94. Daniel W. Drezner, On The Balance Between International Law And Democratic Sover· 
eignty, 2 CHI. J.INT'L L. 321 (2001) (notes the Realpolitik nature of human rights law). 
95. For example, President James Carter made human rights a key plank in his foreign policy. 
Harlan Cleveland, Introduction: The Chain Reaction of Human Rights, in HUMAN DIGNITY: THE 
INTERNATIONALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IX (Alice Henkin ed., 1979). 
96. William C. Plouffe, supra note 38, at 79; also see Lois E. Fielding, Taking The Next Step 
In The Development Of New Human Rights: The Emerging Right Of Humanitarian Assistance To 
Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 329 (1995) (supporting humanitarian intervention 
in Haiti). 
97. See, e.g., Lisa L. Bhansali, New Customary Law: Taking Human Rights Seriously? 87 AM. 
SOC'y lNT'L L. PRoc. 229, 240 (1993) which discusses a case where two rival warlords in the hom of 
Africa were intent on mutual destruction without regard to civilian casualties until the reality that as 
a consequence whoever would win would have no credibility in the outside world. 
98. For a concise compelling account of the use of human rights in statecraft verifying the 
customary nature of international human rights instruments including the UDHR and the ICCPR, see 
Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 16. 
99. Thus, for example, U.S. foreign policy is unilateralist only when unilateraIism serves U.S. 
interests. 
100. Even the U.S. recognizes that non-binding norms may evolve into custom. "[N]orms ... 
may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law." H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 4 
(1991), reprinted in 1992 U.s. C.C.A.N. 84,86. 
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statements is the identification of a universal norm that, even if non-
binding, is universally recognized as a goal to be striven towards. 
B. ENFORCEMENT OF GLOBAL NORMS: STATE PRACTICE 
Opinio juris is, however, only one element of customary international 
law. The other aspect is state practice. In order for a custom to become 
binding law, it must, in practice, be obeyed and be considered obligatory. 
At least within the developed world, the norms of international human 
rights law are, generally, already observed in domestic law. Further, the 
U.N. has created a series of conventions which also reflect an increasing 
practice of states recognizing international human rights. The ICCRPlO1 
and ICESCR,102 as well as the CEDAW and CAT, include optional en-
forcement clauses or optional enforcement protocols. It is through these 
conventions and the practice of national law that the praxis required to 
support the finding of a customary law can be recognized. 
This two-step approach to human rights shows why the U.N. conventions 
can be seen as operating as a "ratchet." This approach also has the ad-
vantage that, over time, it may lead to the crystallisation of a customary 
rule in international law, going further than that of the treaty norm to 
bind non-parties, also. 
C. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
Determining who has a claim to a right, the state or an individual, is as 
important in the genealogy of rights as determining the content of that 
right. Further, in practice, the question "who has a right" is logically 
antecedent to the question "what right exists." Sometimes the U.N. con-
ventions (ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, CERD etc.) recognize rights 
already inhering in individuals, which they may now enforce against 
states, sometimes the conventions merely create duties on the part of 
states toward each other. 
The question whether, and when, individual legal rights or duties shall be 
recognized turns on the goals of international law and whether such 
rights and duties hinder or help achieve those goals. The primary goal of 
international law is to impose order. 103 Order does not necessarily entail 
101. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,1966, Optional Protocol, 999 
V.N.T.S. 302. 
102. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 993 
V.N.T.S.3. 
103. "[T]he goal of international law-namely the achievement of a stable, just international 
order." Lucas W. Andrews, Sailing Around The Flat Eanh: The International Tribunal For The 
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justice. The primacy of legal order is generally justified for practical 
reasons: without order there can be neither peace, nor justice. Conse-
quently, claims of individual justice are generally secondary in the inter-
national hierarchy of norms to claims of order. But is that view entirely 
correct? 
In fact, claims for justice may strengthen the international legal order. 
That is, a claim for justice and a fact of order are generally mutually rein-
forcing. While it is true that order and peace are necessary prerequisites 
to justice; peace and order are also consequences of justice. Thus, a just 
system is also orderly, but an orderly system is not necessarily just. Fur-
thermore, a tyrannical order is inherently unstable. At some point, re-
pression gives way to resistance and rebellion. Thus, where claims of 
justice and order are mutually reinforcing, the international legal system 
will seek to impose not only order, but also justice. 
This argument is based on the general principle that law is logically 
structured (both by principles of hierarchy and symmetry); is guided by 
practical reasoning; and follows a teleology favoring peace and prosper-
ity. Thus, the international legal system may even be said to defend jus-
tice when its defense does not hinder the maintenance of order. That 
may be the case of humanitarian intervention or of the right to national 
self-determination. Granting individuals a legal right to a remedy for 
violations of human rights will discourage tyrannical orders from viol at -
ing human rights, thereby assuring that the stability of the international 
order is not founded on terror. Rather than insuring the false stability of 
tyrannical orders, the international system protects individuals against 
injustice by according them protections against the most egregious viola-
tions of international jus cogens norms. International law sees order as a 
general precondition for peace and prosperity. However, this general 
principle does admit some exceptions, and its telos, peace and prosperity, 
explains the limits of the principle that the international system seeks to 
create and maintain a stable, peaceful and prosperous world order. 
Recognizing that individuals have rights and duties under international 
law is not only contemporary practice, it is also logical. This transforma-
tion - from a system predicated on maintaining order prior to justice, 
toward a system predicated on justice in order to preserve order - can be 
seen in the third-generation rightsl04 to democracy, peace and develop-
Former Yugoslavia As A Failure Of Jurisprudential Theory, II EMORY INT'L L. REv. 471, 513 
(1997). 
104. Gudmundur A1fredsson, The United Nations And Human Rights, 25 INT'L J. LEGAL INFo. 
17,21 (1997). 
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ment. \05 It can also be seen in the rights to humanitarian assistancelO6 and 
humanitarian intervention. It can even be seen in the right to national 
self-detenrunation. 107 While that transformation is far from complete, it 
is clear that the international system is moving from a logic of "order 
will ensure peace and eventually obtain justice" to a logic that "justice 
will encourage peace." As the international system moves toward justice 
as its primary goal, and away from order as its primary goal, any preten-
sions that the world is still Westphalian become increasingly untenable. 
Recent case law is increasingly recognizing that both natural and legal 
persons can owe duties under international law toward other individuals 
(Flick;\08 Krupp), 109 or even have rights against individuals (Marcos llO; 
Alien Tort Claims Act) which arise out of the law of nations, both in 
civil (Kadic v Karadzic)lll and penal law (Eichmann).l12 These cases 
show the resolution of tension between state and individual claims and 
the evolution of binding custom from non-binding hortatory declarations. 
According rights and duties to individuals, with corresponding remedies, 
will serve the goal of achieving and maintaining a just, and thus stable, 
international order. 
Despite limitations on the protection of human rights, the U.N. conven-
tion system does protect individual rights by granting a remedy to both 
states and non-state actors. Note that these protections are constantly 
expanding. The U.N. convention system constitutes part of an interna-
105. J. Oloka-Onyango, Human Rights And Sustainable Development In Contemporary Africa: 
A New Dawn, Or Retreating Horizons? 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 39, 43 (2000). 
106. The right to humanitarian intervention is attributed to Grotius and can be traced even 
further back to Suarez. 'The 1579 Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos asserted that 'it is the right and duty 
of princes to interfere in behalf of neighbouring peoples who are oppressed on account of adherence 
to the true religion, or by any obvious tyranny,'" W. DUNNING, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES 
FROM LUTHER TO MONTESQUIEU, 55 (1905). 
107. U.N. Charter arts. 1,2,55. 
108. U.S. v. Flick and Others, 9 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 1. 
109. U.S. v. Krupp and Others, 10 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 69. 
110. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rts. Litia., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992). 
111. Kadic v. Karadzic (Part III: Justiciability) discusses in detail the requirements of the politi-
cal question doctrine. Note that in Kadic no political question was found. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 
F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied 518 US 1005 (1996) available at: 
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/dianalkaradzicl4298-12.html>. 
112. Interestingly, Eichmann is not the only case where a national was kidnapped in a foreign 
state by a prosecuting state but had no remedy because the remedy was held by the state where he 
was kidnapped. See Crim. 4 juin 1964, Argoud, JCP. 1964, II, 13806, rapport Comte (France: Cour 
de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle). See also, Brigette Belton Homrig, Abduction As An Alternative 
To Extradition--A Dangerous Method To Obtain Jurisdiction Over Criminal Defendants, 28 WAKE 
FOREST L. REv. 671 (1993). Manuel Noriega also complained of abduction in U.S. v. Noriega, 117 
F.3d 1206, 1222 (lIth Cir. 1997) - and just as unsuccessfully. 
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tional system of global governancel13 using functionalist methods, which 
breaks from the Westphalian model of states as hermetic monopolists of 
legitimate authority. For, under the Westphalian system, only states 
could have rights and duties under international law, and could not be 
held accountable for their acts vis-a.-vis their subjects within their bor-
ders. These treaties, in contrast, recognize rights inhering in individuals. 
This constitutes more evidence of the fact that the international system 
has definitively broken from the Westphalian system to create institu-
tions of global governance, a fact which is also proven by the prolifera-
tion of treaties by intergovernmental organizations changing inter-state 
relations since 1945.114 
The principle of sovereignty has declined at exactly the same moment as 
the principle of human rights has risen. How do these facts influence our 
theoretical perspective? 
III. THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS I15 
The idea of human rights is, at first glance, a vague and ambiguous con-
cept!16 For this very reason, though, the idea has a universal appeal, 
being all things to all men. Though problematic,1I7 the claim of human 
rights to universalism is valid - and indeed globalism and universalism 
can, in theory, be complementary movements and certainly correlate in 
practice. I IS Humanists point to the common needs and aspirations of all 
persons as evidence of a common humanity, which is the foundation of 
universal rights. This humanist ideal has undergone much historical de-
velopment over time. Is the idea of human rights universal, and if so, in 
113. Ulrich K. Preuss, The Force, Frailty, And Future Of Human Rights Under Globalisation, I 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283, 304 (2000) (argues that the international community is in transition 
from nation state to global community). 
114. Jose E. Alvarez, supra note 46 at 216, available at: 
<http://www.bc.edulbc_orglavp/law/lwsch/joumals/bcicJr/25_2103_FMS.htm>. 
115. Some argue that the incoherence within human rights is inherent in the concept of human 
rights and not merely due to cultural splits. Ruti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 301, 302 (1997) (arguing that the dualisms and ambiguity of international human rights law 
can be resolved via resort to history). 
116. John King Gamble, Teresa A. Bailey, Jared S. Hawk, Erin E. McCurdy, Human Rights 
Treaties: A Suggested Typology, An Historical Perspective, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 33, 34 
(200 I) (ineluctability of human rights). 
117. For a discussion of how human rights may be a tool of western imperialism see JOHAN 
GALTUNG, THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED: SOME LEss APPLAUDABLE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TRADITION IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERSPECTIVE 152 
(Asbjom Eide, Bernt Hagtvet, eds. 1992) (arguing that human rights are not only a key to liberation 
but also a vector of state control). 
118. PETER FITzpATRICK, GLOBALISATION AND THE HUMANITY OF RIGHTS 2000 (I) Law, 
Social Justice and Global Development (LGD) at: <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/globaVissue/2000-
IIfitzpatrick.html> (arguing that globalism, like human rights, is a universalist ideology and, thus 
globalism permits human rights to escape the limits of the nation state). 
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what sense? If, and only if, human rights are universal, can they be a 
pillar of the post-Westphalian order. Furthermore, because the historical 
transformations in the conception of human rights influence the positive 
law, they condition, limit, and even direct the content of the law. 
The imputation of legal rights and duties to individuals under interna-
tionallaw often occurs via human rights. However, while human rights 
are a key feature of the post-Westphalian state system, human rights will 
only be a stable structural element of that system if they are, in fact, uni-
versal. 119 Despite theoretical confusion 120 and cultural clash,121 which 
obscure their sources,122 resulting in difficulty in defining rights,123 the 
idea of human rights is indeed universal. Consequently, human rights 
can impute rights and duties to non-state actors and will be a key feature 
of the post-Westphalian order.124 
Our first demonstration of the universality of human rights l25 is a nega-
tive proof. The universality of human rights is, in fact, demonstrated by 
the very existence of these debates. Were human rights not an idea with 
universal aspects, these debates would not exist. However, merely ac-
knowledging a universal concept of "human rights" does not help deter-
mine what that concept is, and whether that concept is also universal. 
Fortunately, this negative proof126 of the universality of human rights is 
not the only one available. A more ambitious, affirmative demonstration 
119. The universality debate has been presented as a "clash of civilisations" (describing the 
debates between the 'politics of universalism' and the 'politics of difference.' and 'identity politics' 
in international criminal law on the basis of group affiliation). Martha C. Nussbaum, In Defense Of 
Universal Value, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 379,447 (2000). 
120. Brenda Cossman, Reform, Revolution, Or Retrenchment? International Human Rights In 
The Post-Cold War Era, 32 HARV.INT'L L.1. 339, 340 (1991) (rights are superior in the hierarchy of 
norms because they are universal in space and time). 
121. Jennifer Nedelsky, Communities Of Judgment And Human Rights, 1 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 245 (2000) (universality debate must be seen as a discourse between different commu-
nities). 
122. Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology Of Human Rights, 36 VA. 1. INT'L L. 589, 589-590 (1996) 
(human rights are ambiguous as to their scope, content, and philosophical bases). 
123. John King Gamble, et aI., supra note 116, at 34 (ineluctability of human rights). 
124. ANTONIO CASSESE, supra note 2 at 51 (argues that universality is a myth). 
125. "The concept of the universality of human rights is based on the notion that: (a) there is a 
universal human nature; (b) this human nature is knowable; (c) it is knowable by reason; and (d) 
human nature is essentially different from other reality." Yash Gha, Universalism And Relativism: 
Human Rights As A Framework For Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1094, 
1096 (2000) available at: <http://www.cardozo.yu.edulcardlrev/v21n4/ghai.pdf>. 
126. Another negative proof is the fact that while the contents of the rights are disputed their 
existence is not. Some even go so far as to venture to isolate a "common core" of human rights at 
the global level reflected from national law. See L. Amede Obiora, Reconstituted Consonants: The 
Reach of A "Common Core" Analogy In Human Rights, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 921, 
955 (1998). 
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of the universality of human rights is also possible;127 founded upon a 
neo-Aristotelian understanding of human nature. This understanding 
(unlike Aristotle), which posits a mutually reinforcing relationship be-
tween human rights and the rule of law,128 also posits gender and racial 
equality. But this relationship is not determined by the formal legalism 
of the methods of the rule of law. Rather it is determined by the substan-
tive achievements of human rights - i.e. whether those rights function as 
a means to obtain and secure what Aristotle termed "the good life."129 
Human rights are, thus, a means to the end of political society, which 
insure and obtain not merely life, but the good life, for the members of 
the polity.I3O For this reason, human rights are universal.13I All humans 
have universally common capacities, needs, desires, and an interest in 
prospering. Human rights are the means to a universally desired end. 
While admitting variation for practical reasons, a common teleology en-
sures that certain core elements are universal. 
Finally, a pragmatic argument for the universality of human rights is also 
possible. Looking at positive law, the universality of human rights is a 
legal fact recognized by intemationallaw .132 This argument, like the first 
argument that human rights must exist since everyone is talking about 
them, is not, alone, particularly strong. Even tyrants assert the justice of 
their tyranny. However, the negative argument and the practical argu-
ment complement and strengthen the teleological argument. This argu-
ment can be further strengthened by inquiring into the nature of rights. 
A. RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
Are human rights an inherent and inalienable consequence of humanity? 
Or, are human rights essentially conditioned on acquiescence in, or per-
formance of, societal duties? To some extent, this is a false dichotomy. 
For every right, there is a corresponding duty.133 If I have a right to life, 
127. ANTONIO CASSESE, supra note 2 at 64 (argues for the existence of a common core of 
human rights recognized globally). 
128. SAMUEL HUNTING, lliE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER, 
70 (Simon & Schuster 1996). 
129. E.g., Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik, Buch I, Kap. 2, 3, 5. Available at: 
<ilttp:llwww.uni-rostock.delfakultJphilfaklfkw/iph/strobach/hroseminarelmkethik/aristl.pdf>. 
130. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (c. 350 b.c.) Book I, Part n, available at: 
<http://classics.rnit.edulAristotie/politics.l.one.htm1>. 
131. It is also for this reason that human rights are inherently cosmopolitan and international. 
Robin West, Is The Rule Of Law Cosmopolitan?, 19 QLR 259 (2000). 
132. Elsa Stamatopoulou, supra note 48. at 692. 
133. Mahatma Gandhi, from Yervada Mandir (1930). excerpt at: 
<ilttp:llmeadev.nic.inlGandhileconornics.htm>; H.R. Khanna, Rule of Law. 4 SCC JOUR. 7 (1977) 
available at: <http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articleS/77v4a3.htm>.This principle has also been 
recognized in the case law. See, e.g., Medical Review Committee v. Lim. 8 MAN. R. 2d 407 (Q.B. 
198\). (Canada. province of Manitoba). 
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you have a duty not to kill me. Nonetheless, this debate persists. Be-
cause to say, simply, that rights and duties are two sides of the same 
coin, does not tell us exactly what those rights and duties are. It also 
does not tell us how to resolve doubtful cases where rights and duties are 
in conflict. However, when questioning whether the third world believes 
in human rights, it may help to remember that the third world sponsored 
"New International Economic Order" (NIEO) by a resolution before the 
U.N. General Assembly NIEO I34 in 1974,135 proposing a charter of eco-
nomic rights and duties. 136 Third world scholars accept the idea of eco-
nomic development, one of the keystones of modernity, as the sine qua 
non of existence. 137 
The question whether rights arise from duties reflects the north-south 
debate. Representing the global south, Asian138 schools of thought,139 
whether Islamic,14O Hindu,141 Confucian,142 or Buddhist,143 tend to see not 
rights, but rather duties as primary, and to recognize rights only as a con-
sequence of duty fulfilled. l44 In contrast, western schools of thought, 
notably ius naturale,145 tend to see the foundation of human rights on 
certain inalienable, inherent capacities of humans,l46 generally speaking 
134. See GABE V ARGES, supra note 82, at 5. 
135. See CLAUDE NIGOUL, MAURICE TORRELL!, LES MYSTIFICATIONS DU NOUVEL ORDRE 
INTERNATIONAL, 105 (Paris: PUF 1982). 
136. See GABE V ARGES, supra note 82 at 17. 
137. Tesfatsion Medhanie, Lome: Can it help reverse Africa's marginalisation? 16 STAAT UNO 
GESELLSCHAFf IN AFRIKA 397, 402 (1996). 
138. This view is not however without critique: See, e.g., Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism 
And Political Culture: The Debate Over Human Rights And Asian Values, 11 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 
109, 147 (1998). 
139. ANTONIO CASSESE, supra note 2, at 53. 
140. There is no absence of Islamic scholarship in the west on this topic. Further the Islamic 
scholars do not question the idea of human rights as such but rather the western view of what those 
rights are. See, e.g., Ebrahim Moosa, The Dilemma Of Islamic Rights Schemes, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 
185, 215 (2000); Ann Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash Of Cultures Or A 
Clash With A Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 307 (1994); ABDULAZIZ OTHMAN ALTWAURI, 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC TEACHINGS 4 (2000) available at: 
<http://www.isesco.org.maJpublEnglhumanrightsJpage.htm>. 
141. Editorial, Human Rights: Knots and Webs, Hinduism Today (1996) available at: 
<http://www.hinduism-today.comlI996/6/1996-6-07.html>. 
142. Joseph Chan, Human Rights and Confucian Virtues, IV HARVARD ASIA QTLY. (2000) 
available at: <http://www.fas.harvard.edul-asiactrihaql200003/0003a006.htm>. 
143. Damien Keown, Are There "Human Rights" in Buddhism? 2 J. BUDDHIST ETHICS (1995) 
available at: <http://www.urbandharma.orgludhannalhumanrights.html>. 
144. See, e.g., Mahatma Gandhi, Letter to the Director General of UNESCO, 25 May 1947, IV 
Human Rights Teaching 4 (1985). 
145. See, e.g., Alfred Verdross and Heribert Franz Koeck Natural Law: The Tradition of Uni· 
versal Reason and Authority in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 17 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston eds., 1986). 
146. See, e.g., South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), ICJ 
Reports 1966 250, 297 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka). But see DR. H. AGARWAL, 
IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO iNDIA, 17-18 
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rationality, though Christian theologiansl47 would combine that theory 
with the idea that that rationality is a reflection of divine perfection. 148 
Ius naturale is generally contrasted with positivism,149 not only in na-
tionallaw but also in international law. 150 That split can also be traced to 
the treaty of Westphalia. 151 However, the opposition of positivism to 
naturalism is usually inexact, and often leads to confusion. 152 
As Sohn concisely demonstrates, the split between positivism and natural 
law is a false dichotomy. Positive law and natural law can be comple-
mentary.153 Per Sohn, this is because natural law concerns those inalien-
able rights, whereas positive law concerns alienable rights. 154 Sohn fur-
ther draws the logical conclusion that those elements of international law 
which are jus cogens are a reflection of natural law, whereas those hu-
man rights that are derogable are a reflection of positive law. 155 This, of 
course, could be an extension of Aristotle. For Aristotle, nature (Physis) 
concerns that which is unchangeable (i.e. natural law), that which cannot 
be otherwise; nature is to be contrasted, per Aristotle, from tekhne (gr.) 
or arte (lat.), that which can be other than it is (i.e. man made, or positive 
law). For Sohn, natural law concerns the unchangeable and positive law 
that which is variable. 
Rubin also accurately described the same splits l56 as Sohn. However, 
unlike Sohn, Rubin does not appear to synthesize them. Whether Rubin 
realises it or not, determining where one stands on these splits is a matter 
of science, not opinion. A scientific position is an objective reflection of 
material facts, not a subjective expression of feelings. 
(1983) (arguing that human rights are universal because they arise out of the common equality of all 
persons). 
147. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, SECUNDA SECUNDAE PARTIS §57 (Right) avail-
able at: <http://www.newadvent.orglsummal3.htm>. 
148. Fr. Joseph M. de Torre, Human Rights, NalUral Law, And Thomas Aquinas, VI Catholic 
Social Scientist Review (2001) available at: <http://www.catholicsocialscientists.orglArticle--
deTorre--Human%20Rights.htm>. 
149. For a brief brilliant summary of the (only illusory) contradiction between natural law and 
positivism by the late Louis B. Sohn. See Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 17. 
150. Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies In Public International Law, 32 HARv. lNT'L L.J. 94, 
81-83, (1991 ) (describes "naturalist" "positi vist" dichotomy in intemationallaw). 
151. Id. at 82-83 (describes the supposed decline of ius nalUrale theory). 
152. Unless the two schools of thought take a great deal of care to define their starting point, 
they find themselves talking about quite different things. Id. at 115. 
153. Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 17. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Alfred P. Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens And Offenses Erga Omnes? 35 NEW ENG. L. 
REv. 265, 280, (2001). 
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The science of law is sometimes challenged, though generally only im-
plicitly, by post-modem denials of the existence of objectivity, truth, and 
in ultimo, western culture (its existence or values). Post-modernism can, 
however, pose radical questions: such as, why roughly 80 percent of the 
world controls roughly 20 percent of global resources, and whether war 
is inevitable. However, in rejecting objectivity, and thus knowledge, 
post-modernism throws out the good with the bad. Because of its pre-
sumptions, post-modernism cannot benefit from the earlier work of any 
social theory. For the post-modernist, objectivity does not, and cannot, 
exist. Taking the post-modernists seriously is difficult: their presump-
tions are contrary to common sense. However, one must take post-
modernism seriously, because the post-modernists' denial of basic pre-
sumptions of modernity such as objectivity, science, and progress, per-
mits them to pose serious questions. However, the rejection of the pre-
sumptions of modernity prevents post-modernists from formulating co-
herent answers to the fundamental questions posed. 
Returning to the natural law/positivism dichotomy, the usual supposition, 
of an opposition between positivism and naturalism, is also inapposite 
for less brilliant reasons than Sohn provides. For example, a naturalist 
theory, such as Hobbes' theory, proposes that natural law is nothing 
other than the law of the jungle, that is, the law of the strong, survival of 
the fittest. IS? An alternate school of ius naturale, put forward most fa-
mously by Cicero,158 and later Aquinas,159 argues that, only laws which 
are founded in morality or rationality, are valid. The author regards the 
former theory (Hobbes) as natural law (per Hobbes, lex naturale), and 
the latter (Cicero and Aquinas) as natural justice. Both are branches of 
ius non scripta. 
Just as there is a descriptive and prescriptive theory of ius non scripta 
(natural law and natural justice respectively) there are also descriptive 
and prescriptive versions of positivism. Descriptive positivism limits 
itself to describing law as it is. Prescriptive positivism does not prescribe 
what the law should be; rather, it describes what it perceives as correct 
methods of legal science. Kelsen,l60 following Weberl61 is an example of 
157. "[Tlhe condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of 
war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and 
there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his 
enemies." HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XN (1656). Hobbes also distinguishes between natura1law 
and natural right. 
158. CICERO, THE REpUBLIC at /lI, XXII (Loeb Classical Library, 1950) available at: 
<http://www.thelatinlibrary.comlcicerolrepub.shtmi> (lat.). 
159. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 27. 
160. See, e.g., HANs KELSEN, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE (1925). 
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a prescriptive positivist. Much of the supposed conflict between positiv-
ism and naturalism can be resolved by correctly understanding which 
strand of theory is being considered. Prescriptive theories of natural law 
are, necessarily, in conflict with prescriptive theories of positivism. 
Purely descriptive theories however cannot be in conflict methodologi-
cally, since they only claim to describe reality as it is. 
As Nigel Purvis notes, the claim that positivism is purely descriptive 
explains some of its success in capturing the legal imagination.162 Most 
natural law theories, with the notable exception of Hobbes,163 are, in fact, 
theories of natural justice, and, as such, are prescriptive. However, Pur-
vis, like many others, may be underestimating the methodological diffi-
culties which plague naturalism due to an all too common failure among 
natural law theorists to clearly distinguish prescription from description. 
Since a descriptive positivism has a more limited task than a prescriptive 
naturalism, it necessarily generates a simpler theory, which is less open 
to criticism. However, this theory is descriptively incomplete (no cogni-
tion of whole entities, i.e. the sum is always equal and never greater than 
its parts thus no synergies)l64 and is, essentially, powerless (except in its 
implicit affirmation of the status quo) because it does not prescribe. 
Positivism, like "realism," pursues a much less ambitious theoretical 
objective than naturalism or holism, but for this very reason, it is also 
less influential. In contrast, when naturalist and holist theories fail, their 
failures tend to be glaringly obvious, even spectacular, due to "pure" 
161. MAX WEBER, DER SINN DER "WERTFREIHEIT" DER SOZIOLOGISCHEN UNO OKONOMISCHEN 
WISSENSCHAFfEN (1917). In: Ders.: Gesammelte Aufstitze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tiibingen 1988). 
162. Nigel Purvis, supra note 150, at 81-83 (1991) (describes the naturalist riposte to positiv-
ism). 
163. Hobbes clearly describes a natural law theory - but his natural law is the law of the jungle, 
which like Rousseau, must be escaped by a social contract, i.e. a positive law: 
The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man 
hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that 
is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judge-
ment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XN (1660) available at: 
<http://www.orst.edulinstructlphI302ltextslhobbeslleviathan-contents.htrnl>. The work of both 
Hobbes and Rousseau (and Locke for that matter) is, however, flawed because they presume an 
impossibility, namely the state of nature. Hobbes's theory of natural law - the law of the jungle, 
droit de plus fort, does however carefully distinguishes between natural law and natural right, and 
thus should be distinguished from other theories of natural law which usually do not make this 
distinction and thus confuse prescription and description. 
164. Perhaps the first and best-known example of a synergy arising, where a whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts, is Adam Smith's famous needle factory. Smith pointed out that a factory 
using laborers specialized in different tasks would be far more efficient at needle production than the 
same number of individuals working in isolation. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE 
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 8.1, Ch.l, paragraph 1.1.3 (1776). Available at: 
<http://www.econlib.orgllibrary/SmithlsmWNI.htrnl>. 
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eidetic noesis, i.e. philosophical idealism divorced from material reality. 
Positivist theories, in contrast, are confined to safer positions.165 
Methodologically,l66 the split between positivism and naturalism tracks 
and parallels the splits between materialism and idealism, between atom-
ism and holism, and between realism and transformationism. However, 
though materialism, atomism, positivism and realism tend to be reinforc-
ing, and though historically holism and idealism are usually associated 
with each other, the connection of these different theories to each other is 
not a necessary one. This author, for example, takes a holistic, material-
istic view that compels him to a transformationist theory. Hobbes, in 
contrast, is a materialist atomist who, however, takes a position of natural 
law, though his "natural law" is in fact, the law of the jungleP67 Only by 
expressing these theoretical differences, and clearly delineating them, 
can post-Westphalian theorists hope to transcend the failures and limita-
tions of the Westphalian state theory. 
This relationship between positivism and natural justice contextualizes 
and guides this paper's theory of human rights. The rights and duties 
theories appear at flrst to present a fundamentally irreconcilable duality. 
However, though there are mutually exclusive dualities, there are also 
dualities which are, in fact, not absolutely opposite and mutually exclu-
sive (discontinuous entities), but rather which are different, not in kind 
but in degree. Such dualities are continuous entities. 168 Logically, a ma-
terialist atomist must believe that the universe is discontinuous, since 
only discontinuous entities resolve into discrete elements. Similarly, 
holists usually see the universe as a continuity, where each microcosm 
reflects the macrocosm (the aporie of light as both a particle and wave 
may be a useful analogy or model to understand this problem). How-
ever, for this reason atomists, perhaps unknowingly, reiterate Pythago-
rean theories which mathematics has long rejected. Suppose, however, 
that mathematical representation is not an arbitrary, pure, formal system 
(though that is in fact the assumption of contemporary mathematics). 
165. See Purvis, supra note 150. 
166. For a good discussion of different methodologies see, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Steven R. 
Ratner, The Method Is The Message, 93 AM. J.INT'LL. 410 (1999). 
167. In fairness to Hobbes, we must note that his first natural law, the law of self preservation, 
by any means necessary, is only his point of departure. He goes on to develop other consequential 
rights which he considers just as "natural" as the right of self preservation. E.g .• pacta sunt servanda 
(inter alia). HOBBES, LEVIATHAN. Ch. XV "Of Other Laws of Nature" (1660) available at; 
<http://www.orst.edulinstructlph1302/textslhobbeslleviathan-c.html#CHAPTER XV>. 
168. To understand the theoretical distinctions between analog and digital conceptualisation see 
GorrFRIED LEmNIZ, A NEW METHOD FOR MAXIMA AND MINIMA AS WELL AS TANGENTS, WHICH IS 
IMPEDED NEITHER BY FRACfIONAL NOR BY IRRATIONAL QUANTITIES, AND A REMARKABLE TYPE OF 
CALCULUS FOR THIS (1684); IsAAC NEWfON, FLUXIONS (1666 - then unpublished working paper, 
later published), IsAAC NEWfON, ANALYSIS WITH INFINITE SERIES (1711). 
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Suppose, instead, that mathematical representation, rather than being an 
arbitrary and purely formal system, is somehow a reflection of material 
reality. Now, clearly irrational numbers such as radical two exist, the 
ratio between a hypotenuse and one of the equilateral legs of a right equi-
lateral triangle is, in fact, radical two. However, the decimal representa-
tion of this ratio is non-terminating and non-repeating. This implies that 
the holist representation of material reality is correct, and that the atomist 
representation is incorrect, because, if a line segment could be split into 
atoms, then ratios, such as radical two, could be represented as whole 
numbers, or at least as whole fractions. The holist theory appears to be 
more accurate here because it permits a representation of a ratio of two 
wholes, which, though paradoxical, clearly exists. In contrast, the atom-
ist representation of discrete digital numbers cannot adequately describe 
this ratio. A similar analysis also holds true for pi, namely the ratio of a 
circumference of a circle and the radius of a circle. There, however, the 
ratio is complicated by the fact that a circumference is a curve. There-
fore, the example of radical two is easier to illustrate the limitations of 
atomistic thinking. 
If ideas are merely a reflection of material reality, and not an abstract 
model divorced from material reality, then the atomist model, that the 
universe can be divided into ultimate discrete elements which cannot be 
further subdivided, and which serve as the fundamental basis of analysis, 
is incorrect. An ever-smaller point can always be imagined. This is why 
geometry presumes that any line segment is made of an infinite number 
of points. Atomists, in contrast, presume that the process of division 
must end somewhere. But assuming the opposite position, that the uni-
verse is a discontinuous whole, presumably, as in integral calculus, the 
possibility of an infinite series converging upon a limit. The presump-
tion of continuity, which, like radical two is paradoxical, is consistent 
with holism, and leads to empirically verifiable, and useful, conclusions. 
The presumption of discontinuity leads to contradiction. Consequently, 
the holist position is again better able to represent reality and is probably 
more correct than the atomist position. This argument, of course, relies 
on the materialist presumption that ideas reflect material reality, and do 
not exist independently of material reality. It also relies on the presump-
tion - which, again, is not the presumption of modern mathematics - that 
mathematics, like any idea, is a reflection of material reality, and thus, 
not a purely formal system. 
Pointing out the mathematical deficiencies in atomism does not say there 
is no place for analysis in scientific thought. It is intended, rather, to 
temper the role that such analysis is given in a comprehensive theory. 
Obviously, both continuity and discontinuity have their place in mathe-
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matics. The fact that holism can consistently integrate atomism as a spe-
cial theory, and maintain the presumptions of holism as a general theory, 
explains why it is the more powerful theory, despite the risks inherent 
either in complex theorization or normative prescriptions. Those risks 
are inevitable in law. 
How is this understanding of continuity at the theoretical level pertinent? 
The contradiction between rights theories ("western" theories) and duties 
theories ("eastern" theories) of human rights is only apparent. Both 
western and eastern schools of thought are elements in a continuity, as 
both are linked by the common element, humanity. As expressions of 
degrees of continuity, these apparent opposites are, in fact, reconcilable. 
Looking at western thinkers, when exploring the thoughts of Plato, he 
clearly postulates duties as primary in his Republic. 169 To the extent that 
Aristotle acknowledges the idea of "right" (and thus of "rights"),170 he 
posits them as a consequence of human rationality.17I But Aristotle's 
conception of rights is balanced by his understanding of the inherently 
social nature of humans. For Aristotle, like Rousseau,172 the state finds 
its origins in the family and it, unlike its individual members, the state 
(an extended family) is self sufficient. Because the state is self-
sustaining, it has priority over anyone of its members. 173 Thus, Aris-
totle's conception of rights, like Rousseau's, would necessarily contextu-
alize rights by the society in which they are found. Indeed, it is only 
relatively late in western thought that Locke presented the possibility of 
rights divorced from society. Locke's labor theory of value permits an a-
social man, because property, according to Locke, is not a social relation, 
but the consequence of individuallaborl74 - which is empirically defensi-
169. PLATO, REpUBLIC, Book IV, available at: 
<http://classics.mit.eduIPlatolrepublic.5.iv.html>. 
170. Aristotle does speak of "civil rights" i.e. Biirgerrechte; Aristotle, Athenian Constitution -
Part 7, Sections 61 - 69 (translated by Sir Frederic G. Kenyon) available at: 
<http://www.ekloges.com.cy/nqcontent.cfm?tt=article&a_id= 1540>. 
171. This can be seen by the example of the slave: Aristotle regards the slave as only capable of 
apprehending but not forming ideas. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book I, Part 5, Para. 3 (c. 350 b.c.) 
available at: <http://classics.mit.edulAristotle/politics.l.one.html>. Consequently the slave has few 
rights. However the slave, like the drunkard, also has fewer duties, and for a similar reason - at least 
per Aristotle. 
172. "La plus ancienne de toutes les societes et la seule naturelle est celie de la famille. ... La 
famille est donc si I'on veut Ie premier modele des societes politiques" JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 
CONTRAT SOCIAL, Livre I, Ch. II (1762) available at: 
<http://un2sg4.unige.chlathenalrousseaulijr_cont.html#LII2>. 
173. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book I, Part II (translated by Benjamin Jowett) available at: 
<http://classics.mit.edulAristotielpolitics.l.one.htmi> . 
174. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT, Ch. V Sec. 28 (1698) available at 
<http://history .hanover.ed ulearly/lockelj -12-007 .hun>. 
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ble (as well as being the position of Karl Marx)175 - unlike the subjective 
theories of value offered by Rothbardl76 and Mises177 or the post-
modernists. Admittedly, roots of theoretical atomism can also be found 
in Hobbes,178 and even Rousseau.179 But it is only with Locke that the 
individual can be divorced from society, because property is now a prod-
uct, not a relation. 180 However for Aristotlel81 and Rousseaul82 the 
autonomous, autarchic, and thus independent, human of the social con-
tract postulated by Hobbesl83 and Locke, in any of the various shades of 
that theory, is simply impossible.l 84 
175. KARL MARX, MORCEAUX CHOISIS 263 (Nizan, P. et Duret, J. eds., Paris: Librairie Galli-
mard, 1934) (citing the Karl Marx work, SALAIRES, PRIX ET PROFIT). Marx and Locke also agree on 
the distinction between use value and exchange value: JOHN LocKE, OF CIVIL GoVERNMENT, Book 
II, Ch. V §46-51 eps. §50; KARL MARX, CONTRIBUTION A LA CRITIQUE DE L'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE 
(paris, Editions Sociales); KARL MARX CAPITALE 40 (Paris: Presses Universitaires Fran~ais 1993). 
176. See e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, ED., THE LoGIC OF ACTION ONE 78-99 (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ud. 1997). 
177. See, e.g., LUDWIG MISES, MONEY, METHOD AND THE MARKET PROCESS, Ch. 3, "Episte-
mological Relativism in the Sciences of Human Action" (Richard M. Ebeling. ed., Amsterdam: 
Kluwer Academic Pubs. 1990) (Article first published in 1962) available at: 
<http://www.mises.orgJmmmp/mmmp3.asp>. 
178. Hobbes' natural law (the law of the jungle) is clearly atomist. 
The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man 
hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that 
is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judge-
ment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. 
According to Hobbes, in the state of nature, "right" is equivalent to "power," irrespective of society 
or family. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XN, OJ The First And Second Natural Laws, And Of Con-
tracts (1660) available at: <http://www.uoregon.edul-rbear/hobbeslleviathan.htmi>. 
179. Only in so far as the pacte social constitutes society out of individuals, adhesion to the 
supposed contract. This, however, contradicts Rousseau's recognition that all states arise out of 
extended families. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du PACTE SOCIAL, chs. II,VI (1762). 
180. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT, Ch. V, § 28 (1764) available at: 
<http://history.hanover.edulearlyllockelj-12-007.htm>.This is incidentally the alienation of which 
Marx speaks - our alienation from the product of our labor; our commodification. 
181. "He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything 
else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a union of those who 
cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female ... The family is the association estab-
lished by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants ... But when several families are united, and 
the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed 
is the Village ... When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be 
nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and 
continuing in existence for the sake of a good life." ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 173. 
182. «La plus ancienne de toutes les societes et la seule naturelle est celIe de la famille. » 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL OU PRINCIPES DU DROIT POLITIQUE, Livre I, Ch. II 
(1762) available at: <http://un2sg4.unige.ch/athenalrousseauljjr30nt.htrni>. 
183. "[TJhe condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of 
war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and 
there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his 
enemies." HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XN, para. 4 (1660) available at: 
<http://oregonstate.edulinstructlphI302ltexts!hobbeslleviathan-contents.html> (searchable). 
184. 'The philosophers, who have examined the foundations of society, have, every one of 
them, perceived the necessity of tracing it back to a state of nature, but not one of them has ever 
arrived there." JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU (1712-1778), On the Inequality among Mankind (The 
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Yet, though the social contract is not a historical fact, and the state of 
naturelS5 an impossible fiction. Social contract theory appears to have 
influenced realist state theory. This theory sees the state as self-
sufficient, but living in the state of nature as to other states,IS6 and, as 
such, having only one law, the law of the strongest. This "vision" 
(nightmare seems more exact) is every bit as unrealistic as the social 
contract theory, which appears to have spawned it and, like social con-
tract theory, must be rejected for empirical reasons: it does not corre-
spond to material reality. Social contract theory and realist state theory 
do not even have much heuristic utility, for the presumptions of these 
theories are so contrary to fact that they cannot provide even an ap-
proximate or simplified view of how states are actually formed, or actu-
ally behave.187 
A credible argument can be made that, in pursuing the autarchic indi-
vidualist ideal of enlightenment, western society sowed the seeds of its 
own deracination and alienation, as Marx noted. ISS Still, while there are, 
certainly, real points of divergence, even within western theories of 
rights, the fact is both west and east see individual rights as a conse-
quence of rationality, and as implying, or even being grounded upon, 
social duties i.e. as a consequence of a commonality and personhood. 
Consequently, they can serve a key role in the post-Westphalian world. 
Turning from legal theory to legal practice, again, western theory does 
not ignore duties. For example, the first part of the state constitution of 
the Free Hansa State Bremen is entitled "Fundamental rights and du-
ties."ls9 The East German Constitution granted both a right and duty to 
work. 190 Again, in the Swiss Federal Constitution, the duties are also 
Harvard Classics, 1909-14) available at: <http://www.bartleby.coml34/311002.htrn1>. See also. Jiri 
Priban, Stealing the Natural Language: The Function of the Social Contract and Legality in the 
Light of Nietzche's Philosophy, 24 CARDOZO L.REv. 663, 664 (2003) available at: 
<http://www.cardozo.yu.edulcardlrev/v24n2lPribanO/020FinaIO/020Version.pdf>. 
185. See. e.g .. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT, Ch. II (1764) available at: 
<http://history.hanover.edulearlyllocke/j-12-004.htm.> 
186. KENNETHN. WALTZ,MAN, THESTATE,ANDWAR(Columbia Univ. Press 1954). 
187. In contrast, the simplified model of the economy provided by the "homo economicus" 
does, roughly, approximate how economic actors in fact behave. Like the states in IR realism, 
economic actors are posited as rational maximisers of their utility. However, the economic game is 
positive sum, whereas IR theory generally proposes that IR is a zero sum game. In economic theory, 
altruists can be safely ignored as they are a distinct minority. In contrast, realist IR assumptions do 
not in fact reduce the variables which influence state behavior in a meaningful way because the 
variables eliminated (economic factors) are more relevant than the ones retained (military factors!). 
188. KARL MARX, EcONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, "The Alienation of 
Labour" (1844) available at <http://www.wsu.edu:8080/-deeIMODERN/ALIEN.HTM>. 
189. Landesverfassung der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, Artikel I - 20, Erster Hauptteil: Grun-
drechte und Grundpflichten, available at: <http://www.bremen.delinfolskpllvNrfssngl.htm>. 
190. Verfassung der DDR, Artikel24 available at: 
<http://www.ddr-im-www.delGesetzeNerfassung.htm>. 
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underlined. 191 This is not limited to the German-speaking world. The 
French constitution also speaks of rights and duties as concomitant. 192 
B. MORAL RELATIVISM193 AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM194 VERSUS 
UNIVERSALISM 
One attack on human rights argues they are not universal,195 either be-
cause no universal values exist (post-modernism)196 or because human 
rights represent western valuesl97 (cultural relativism).198 Both these at-
tacks are erroneous. l99 
As in the question whether duties are a-priori a-rights, the question 
whether human rights is a universal concept can be posited in terms of a 
geographic schism between the industrialised north and the developing 
(I) Jeder BUrger der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik hat das Recht auf Arbeit. Er 
hat das Recht auf einen Arbeitsplatz und dessen freie Wahl entsprechend den gesell-
schaftlichen Erfordernissen und der perstinlichen Qualifikation. Er hat das Recht auf 
Lohn nach Qualitiit und Quantitiit der Arbeit. Mann und Frau, EIWachsene und 
Jugendliche haben das Recht auf gleichen Lohn bei gleicher Arbeitsleistung. 
(2) Gesellschaftlich niitzliche Tatigkeit ist eine ehrenvolle Pflicht flir jeden arbeitsfahigen 
Biirger. Das Recht auf Arbeit und die Pflicht zur Arbeit bilden eine Einheit. 
191. Schweizerische Bundesverfassung, art. 6, Individuelle und gesellschaftliche Verantwor-
tung: 
Jede Person nimmt Verantwortung fur sich seIber wahr und tragt nach ihren Kraften zur 
BewaItigung der Aufgaben in Staat und Gesellschaft bei. 
available at: <http://www.admin.ch/ch/disr/lOl/a6.html>. 
192. Declaration Des Droits De L'homme Et Du Citoyen De 1789 
Les Representants du Peuple Fran<;ais, constitues en Assernblt~e Nationale, considerant 
que l'ignorance, l'oubli ou Ie mepris des Droits de l'Homrne sont les seules causes des 
malheurs publics et de la corruption des Gouvernements, ont resolu d'exposer, dans une 
Declaration solennelle, les droits naturels, inalienables et sacres de I'Homme, afin que 
cette Declaration, constamment presente a tous les Membres du corps social, leur rappelle 
sans cesse leurs droits et leurs devoirs. 
available at: <http://www.assemblee-nat.fr/connaissance/constitution .asp>. 
193. Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism And Cultural Imperialism In Human Rights Law,S 
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 211, 221 (1999) (describes the universalism/relativism debate). 
194. Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, And Saviors: The Metaphor Of Human Rights 42 HARv. 
INT'L L.J. 201, 204 (2001) (points out the irony of brutalizing colonial powers pushing for the Nur-
emberg trials and adopting the UDHR). 
195. For a discussion of the contours (and limits) of the universality/relativism debate in an 
intercultural comparative context see Yash Ghai, Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a 
Framework for Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 CARDOZO L.R. 1095 (2000) available at: 
<http://www.undp.org.fj/electionslreports/ghai.pdf>. 
196. See, e.g., Ziihtii Arslan, Taking Rights Less Seriously: Postmodemism and Human Rights, 
5 RES PuBLICA 195 available at: <http://www.philosophy.ruIlibrary/pdf/234617 .pdf>. 
197. Richard Klein, supra note 86, at 4 (UDHR rooted in western values). 
198. ANTONIO CASSESE, supra note 2, at 52; Sarah Joseph, A Rights Analysis Of The Covenant 
On Civil And Political Rights, 5 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 57, 74-75 (1999) (arguing that the distinction 
between rights and duties is artificial). , 
199. "[T]he cultural relativist theories of the academy are tautological and overly deterministic 
because they fail to appreciate the roles of both human agency and institutions in the transformative 
processes of cultural discourse." Michael C. Davis, supra note 138, at llO. 
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south.2OO Very different challenges to the universality of human rights 
arise in each of these regions due to differing economic conditions. 
However, neither challenge alone, or in combination, is sufficiently 
strong to defeat the theory that there are universally common characteris-
tics of human nature, which in turn, are the foundation of a similarly 
universal theory of human rights, which, in turn, engenders a legally 
binding practice of human rights. 
These challenges are the result of cultural relativism in the north, and 
accusations, or fears of accusations, of cultural imperialism201 by the 
south.202 Not un surprisingly, the moral relativists203 are essentially west-
emers.204 But those who argue there is no moral knowledge ignore the 
fact that the prototypic liberals, Aristotle and Locke, do believe in objec-
tive moral knowledge. Neo-liberals (i.e. ultra-capitalists) abuse the term 
"liberal." Neo-liberals, such as Posner,205 believe there are no moral val-
ues; there are only market values. This is one of the splits between clas-
sicalliberalism and neo-liberalism. Thus post-modernists are mistaken if 
they believe that moral relativism somehow advances "left" or "classi-
cal" liberal agendas. Quite the opposite, moral relativism, like "value 
neutrality," implicitly affirms the status quo. 
The West seems to have a monopoly on moral relativism because of eco-
nomics. Westerners are products of societies of such superabundance 
that they can afford the lUXUry of entertaining ideas206 such as "all truths 
200. See, e.g. Dianne Otto, Rethinking The "Universality" Of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REv. I (1997). 
201. Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, And Saviors, supra note 194, at 204-205 (argues that 
human rights is Eurocentric, though well-meaning, and unknowingly reiterates colonial paradigms). 
202. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Goltzman, Cultural Relativism or Cultural Intrusion? Female Ritual 
Slavery in Western Africa & the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Ghana as a 
Case Study, 4 N.ENG.INT'L & COMPo L. ANN. 53,66 (1998) available at: 
<http://www.nesl.eduJintljoumallvoI4indx.cfm>. 
203. For a good explanation of the problems of moral relativism (which, however, fails to 
recognize the fact that in any formal system axioms are necessary to formal representation and 
necessarily tautological) see Michael J. Perry, Moral Knowledge, Moral Reasoning, Moral Relativ-
ism: A "Naturalist" Perspective, 20 GA. L. REv. 995, 1003-1009 (1986) (proposing a method for 
valid normative inference using practical reasoning i.e. phronesis but discussing although only 
obliquely Hume's position on normative inference). 
204. A cogent but extreme reply to moral relativism points out that for liberals like Rawls, 
Ackerman, and Dworkin there is no moral knowledge. Id. at 995. That view may go too far. 
Clearly, the prototypic liberals Aristotle and Locke do believe in objective moral knowledge. So, 
what Perry is identifying is actually the neo-liberal (i.e. ultra-capitalist) abuse of the idea of liberal-
ity. 
205. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, (Boston: Harvard 1981). 
206. The failure of the moral relativists to grasp reality can be shown by a crude reductio: 
genital mutilation. Who cares to argue for it? There is no absence of literature. See, e.g., Adam 
Karp, Genitons In The Global Context: Female Genital Mutilation As Ton Under The Alien Ton 
Claims Act, The Tonure Victim Protection Act, And The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 315 (1997); Sylvia Wynter "Genital Mutilation" Or "Symbolic Binh?" 
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are relative."207 Of course, if truth were only relative, then no objective 
truth could exist. That, however, creates a paradox. A truth statement 
that no truth statements exist is itself a truth statement. Relativist argu-
ments, whether as to epistemology, i.e. truth scepticism, or axiology, i.e. 
moral relativism, can be seen either as the product of confused208 reason-
ing,209 or as a product of a cuiture210 so blinded by its own wealth that it 
cannot see the starvation and death that are all too common in the third 
world. 
Because moral relativists often suffef11 from having never been con-
fronted with genuine moral choices, let alone a genuine moral dilemma, 
they threaten the very existence of the rights that generated the abun-
dance that they consume. One might consider this, like most errors, to be 
a self-correcting problem. However, due to the economic plight of the 
third world, one might question whether self-correction is the best cor-
rection in this case. Further, an accusation that the human rights dis-
course of the west is cultural imperialism212 is probably not self-
Female Circumcision, Lost Origins, And The Aculturalism OJ FeministlWestern Thought, 47 CASE 
W. REs. L. REv. 501 (1997); L. Amede Obiora, Bridges And Barricades: Rethinking Polemics And 
Intransigence In The Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 275 (1997). 
A moral relativist cannot oppose genital mutilation (or any other act) since all cultures are (to the 
relativist) equally valid. 
207. Epistemologically, truth scepticism must be distinguished from post-modernist truth abne-
gationism. Truth scepticism with roots in Nietzsche merely challenges whether what we are told is 
"truth" is in fact "true." FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, JENSEITS VON GUT UND BOSE, (I 887) available at: 
<http://www.gutenberg2000.delnietzsch/jenseits/Ohtmldir.htm>. Truth abnegation denies the exis-
tence of truth. 
208. Much of the confusion lies in the belief that statements must be either true or false. Aris-
totle himself noted that some statements, such as prayers, have no truth value. 
Every sentence has meaning, not as being the natural means by which a physical faculty 
is realized, but, as we have said, by convention. Yet every sentence is not a proposition; 
only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sen-
tence, but is neither true nor false. 
ARISTOTLE, ON INTERPRETATION (c. 350 B.C.) (translated by E. M. Edghill) Section I, Part N, 
para. 2, available at: <http://classics.mit.edulAristotlelinterpretation.l.l.html>. Also see Sanford 
Shieh, Undecidability, Epistemology, and Anti-Realist Intuitionism, 2 NORDIC J. PHILOSOPHICAL 
LOGIC 55, available at: <http://www.hf.uio.no/filosofi/njpUvoI2n02/decidableidecidable.pdf>. 
209. One root of the confusion is the recognition by Kurt GOdel that the truth value of some 
propositions of formal logic cannot be determined by a formal system. KURT GbDEL, ON 
FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS OF PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA AND RELATED SYSTEMS, 
(I 931) available at: <http://nago.cs.colourado.edul-hirzeUpapers/canonOO-goedel.pdf>. 
210. The best attacks on the universality of human rights focus on the cultural flaws of the north 
and question its moral legitimacy. E.g., 'The human rights movement is marked by a damning 
metaphor. The grand narrative of human rights contains a subtext that depicts an epochal contest 
pitting savages, on the one hand, against victims and saviors, on the other." Makau Mutua, supra 
note 194, at 201. But even the best attacks criticise not the idea of human rights as such, but rather 
the legitimacy of the north/west to claim to be the fountain of human rights. 
211. "According to the naturalist conception, moral knowledge is knowledge of how to live so 
as to flourish, to achieve well-being." Michael J. Perry, supra note 203, at 997. Those who lack 
moral knowledge literally suffer from their ignorance, as Aristotle notes. 
212. Surya P. Subedi, Are The Principles OJ Human Rights "Western" Ideas? An Analysis Of 
The Claim OJ The "Asian" Concept OJ Human Rights From The Perspectives OJ Hinduism, 30 CAL. 
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correcting. Because of colonialism, the third world's critique of the first 
world's use of human rights as a tool of imperialism may have some 
merit. Further, these two challenges could be mutually reinforcing. 
Thus, a coherent defense of the universality of human rights is crucial, if 
human rights are to serve as a key feature in the post-Westphalian world. 
The critique that human rights are merely cultural imperialism is not 
entirely without merit. Given the west's history of attempts at "civilis-
ing" 213 the third world - its justification for third world labor exploitation 
- the wariness,214 or skepticisim,215 of the third world intellectual toward 
the conflation of western human rights with universal human rights216 and 
the charge that human rights are a merely a smokescreen for imperialism 
is understandable.217 However, despite historical and economic distor-
tion, a basic fact of humanity is true: all healthy humans are rational and 
seek to enjoy the good life in society.218 Thus, there is a genuinely uni-
versal human archetype. Moreover, that rationality is precisely the foun-
dation of fundamental rights. Humans have rights, as rational beings and 
because structures of rights allow that rationality to be deployed practi-
cally, not only in order to survive, but also to attain the good life of 
peace, happiness and social discourse.219 
Again, the supposed theoretical divergence of rights discourse is largely 
illusory, in as much as it is a consequence of economic conditions. Were 
Europe a victim of Indian imperialism, and Africa overfed and under-
worked, Europe would be expressing fears of cultural imperialism and 
w. lNT'L L.J. 45 (1999) (arguing that the idea that human rights is the product of Western Christian 
civilisation is reiteration of selective nineteenth-century values). 
213. Literally: imposing the civil law. GABE S. V AROES, supra note 82. 
214. Surya P. Subedi, supra note 212, at 46. However once again that is not a dispute as to 
whether there are human rights but rather what is the content of those rights. As such, it is no argu-
ment against the universality of human rights. 
215. For example, Nestle sells powdered milk in the third world erroneously arguing that it will 
make babies more intelligent than mother's milk. Further powdered milk requires sterilised water -
and the water in the third world is often impure. Worse, powdered milk is often diluted leading to 
malnutrition and even death from starvation. When Nestle was criticised for this in print, Nestle sued 
for defamation, specifically for Verleumdung and iible Nachrede. Nestle's claim for iible Nachrede 
was upheld. ANTONIO CASSESE, supra note 2, at 138-139. 
216. "[N]ot all human rights principles have their roots in Western civilisation nor are all human 
rights principles necessarily mere Western principles." Surya P. Subedi, supra note 212, at 45. 
217. Martha Minow, Rights and Cultural Difference, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS AND RIGHTS 355 
(Sarat and Kearns eds., 1995) (example of human rights used as tool of domination of First Nations 
in North America). 
218. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book I Part II (translated by Benjamin Jowett) (350 B.C.) 
available at: <http://classics.mit.edulAristotielpolitics.l.one.htmi>. 
219. The good life is, of course, defined by Aristotle as the end of life in political society. [d. 
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India preaching some variety of moral relativism.220 Rights are, to a cer-
tain extent, defined by a society's level of economic development.221 
Relatively impoverished pre-industrial or nascent industrial states simply 
cannot afford to impose affirmative claims posited by second-generation 
rights. However, that does not change the fact that the ultimate founda-
tion and vector of rights is our inherent value as rational social beings.222 
C. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LA W?223 
Just as human rights can be seen as universal in their conception and 
applicability, so also is the foundation of human rights on the rule of law 
not at all unique to white, Christian or western society. This raises the 
question of the relationship between the rule of law and human rights. 
Human rights, as legal rules, cannot exist without a society based on the 
rule of law. The rule of law is a logical precondition to human rights.224 
However, though the rule of law is a necessary precondition to human 
rights, it is not a sufficient condition.225 It is entirely possible to have a 
society founded upon the rule of law, i.e. a jormeller Rechtstaat which 
does observe basic principles of just laws (e.g. no crime without law, no 
retroactive laws), yet which does not acknowledge, or respect, substan-
tive human rights, or even acknowledge the existence of procedural 
rights. 
Consequently, to understand human rights, we must also understand that 
human rights are a possible, but not a necessary, consequence of the rule 
of law. How, then, does a society, which guarantees and achieves sub-
stantive human rights, emerge from a conception of the rule of law as 
merely formal procedures?226 This question is not only interesting be-
220. In fact, Indian discourses on human rights are well-developed and even represented within 
western legal scholarship. See, e.g., Prakash Shah, International Humon Rights: A Perspective From 
India, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 24, 44 (1997). 
221. Yash Ghai, supra note 195 (citing to Chinese legal authority). 
222. Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg To Rangoon An Examination 
Of Forced Labour Cases And Their Impact On The Liability Of Multinational Corporations, 20 
BERKELEY I.INT'L L. 91, 153 (2002). 
223. Robin West, supra note 131 (equality the foundation of mutual respect). 
224. Report of the Joseph R. Crowley Program, One Country, Two Legal Systems?, 23 
FORDHAM INT'L L.I. I, 6 (1999). 
225. Similarly, there is also no necessary connection between democracy and the rule of law. 
Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule Of Law And The Legitimocy Of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 1307, 1308 (2001). 
226. One possible answer is for realist reasons, i.e. Realpolitik considerations. The rule of law, 
like human rights, can be a tool in a state's diplomatic arsenal and serve its foreign policy goals. 
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cause the emergence of human right is not inevitable, it is also relevant to 
the universality debate. If the rule of law is a uniquely western227 con-
cept, and the rule of law is a necessary precondition to human rights, 
then human rights would be a uniquely western concept. In fact, that is 
not the case. Asian societies and aboriginal societies also observed, and 
continue to observe, the formal requirements of the rule of law, and, in 
some cases, have also achieved the positive goals of guaranteeing the 
substantive human rights necessary to obtain the good life. 
This is not to say that there are no unique contributions of western 
thought to theories of the rule of law. Clearly, separation of powers228 
and the right229 to rebeF30 are western inputs to the stock of human 
knowledge. However, neither of these is necessary to have a state gov-
erned by laws. But, because there are many western contributions to the 
theory of human rights, that concept will never be able to escape from 
accusations of cultural imperialism. There are, of course, very good rea-
sons for such an accusation. For example, labor exploitation in the colo-
nial world was justified in the name of the Christian231 duty to "civilise" 
"savages." However, the finalities which human rights serve, namely to 
enable the human, as individual and species, to survive, and not only to 
survive, but also to lead the good life, explain why those accusations are 
227. One can of course question whether the United States are committed to the rule of law: 
the United States has deployed military forces in Grenada, Libya, Nicaragua, Panama, 
and Yugoslavia without authorisation from the United Nations Security Council, as re-
quired by the U.N. Charter. The United States quit UNESCO, failed to pay its U.N. dues 
in a timely manner, withdrew from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 
and refused to comply with the International Court's orders on at least three occasions ... 
the United States has repeatedly executed foreign nationals without according them the 
basic right to consult with their consular representatives ... the United States has failed to 
ratify the International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Con-
vention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines ... the Bush administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol on global warm-
ing, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Protocol to en-
force the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, which banned such 
weapons, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
Joel R. Paul, Holding Multi-National Corporations Responsible Under International Law, 24 
HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 285, 287-288 (2001). 
228. Charles Montesquieu, De L'Esprit des Lois (1758), Livre XI, available at: 
<http://www.uqac.uquebec.ca/zone30/Classiques_des_sciences_sociales!livres!montesquieulmontes 
quieu.html>. 
229. "[nhe American and French Revolutions... established the right of the people to rebel 
against tyranny," Nancy P. Kelly, The Political Offense Exemption To Extradition: Protecting The 
Right Of Rebellion In An Era Of International Political Violence, 66 OR. L. REv. 405 (1987). 
230. Though Hobbes and Rousseau consider the social contract irrevocable, this is not Locke's 
position. JOHN LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT, Ch. XIX §22 (1764) available at 
<http://history.hanover.edulearlyllocke!j-12-001.htm>. 
231. Makau Mutua, What is TWAlL? 94 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 1,37 (2000). 
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ultimately only partly correct. Human rights emerge from the miasma of 
post-modem moral relativism232 precisely where they assert the truly uni-
versal aspects of humanity - namely rationality. All humans, not merely 
rich white males, have an essential dignity and beauty as humans because 
of the capacity to think. As a consequence of rationality, humans also 
have the capacity to acquire and alienate. However, the very rationality 
which permits us to acquire, and alienate, is also the foundation of our 
essential dignity, explaining why certain of our rights are inherently inal-
ienable. For an alienation of our rights - for example food, shelter, and 
respect - destroys the human as human, rendering one at best, dead, and 
at worst, an unthinking animal. 233 
While it could be argued (imprudently, for the argument risks accusa-
tions of cultural arrogance) that the rule of law is originally a western 
concept - for the institutions of democratic self rule234 under law were 
first developed in the west (ignoring for the moment that Athens was a 
slave economy) - the idea of the rule of law is, in fact, not uniquely, nor 
inevitably, western. As recently as the Twentieth Century, the west 
faced several challenges to the rule of law centering on the question of 
genetic inequality in Germany, the United States and South Africa.235 
Furthermore, several contemporary, non-western societies clearly display 
all the aspects of the supposedly western concept of the rule of law. 
However, although the rule of law is a necessary, but not sufficient con-
dition of human rights, it is a necessary and sufficient condition of a 
market economy.236 Without guaranties of the finalities of transaction, 
and without some social mobility, a complex capitalist economy would 
be impossible. While capitalism did originate in the west, it has since 
spread globally, proving the rule of law is not a product of either race or 
the Christian religion - and thus neither uniquely, nor necessarily, west-
232. For good critiques of the flaws and confusion which inherent in post-modem thought due 
to an erroneous axiology and epistemology see Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodem New-
speak and Constitutional "Meaning "for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. R. 461 (1997); Dennis Arrow, 
Spacebal/ (Or, Not Everything that's Left is Postmodem), 54 V AND. L. REV. 2381 available at: 
<http://law.vanderbilt.edunawreview/voI546/arrow.pdf>. 
233. Aristotle argues that man outside of political society is rendered beastlike. 
The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the indi-
vidual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the 
whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is suffi-
cient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. 
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book I, Part IT (ca. 350 b.c.) available at: 
<http://classics.mit.edulAristotlelpolitics.l.one.html> . 
234. The universality debate also exists in democratic theory. Surya P. Subedi, supra note 212, 
at 47. 
235. William G. Ross, Attacks On The Warren Court By State Officials: A Case Study Of Why 
Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 508 (2002). 
236. Richard L. Abel, Capitalism and the Rule of Law: Precondition or Contradiction? 28 LAw 
& SOC'y REV. 971, 987 Goumal renamed: was 15 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 685) (1990). 
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em. Human rights, however, are a function of economic development. 
This, then, is the explanation of how the rule of law ultimately can lead 
to human rights: the rule of law creates necessary pre-conditions· for eco-
nomic prosperity.237 As the economy develops, speaking of substantive 
rights in a meaningful sense becomes possible. Human rights, thus, are 
neither inevitably nor uniquely "western." They are economic functions 
which appear to have first, or most clearly, developed in the western 
world. 
However, while economic development does make it possible to speak of 
rights in a meaningful sense, theories that international human rights law 
somehow resembles lex mercatoria confuse the possible with the neces-
sary. While possible that economic development can permit the emer-
gence of human rights, it is not necessary. The correlation between eco-
nomic development and human rights is not causal. How, then, have 
human rights, in fact, developed with economic progress? 
IV. THE GENERATIONAL THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The growth of human rights, which has roughly paralleled economic 
development, is usually238 described as having evolved over time in three 
successive waves,239 from easily implemented240 individuaF41 negative 
claims, to freedom from the state, to positive collective242 claims, to enti-
tlements to state resources. At least one scholar has tried to draw an a-
historical, but philosophically interesting, parallel between first-
generation rights as expressions of liberty, second-generation rights as 
expressions of equality, and third-generation rights as expressions of 
solidarity.243 Such a description is almost poetic in its symmetry, and 
237. "Human Rights ensure international security and prosperity" speech by the Foreign Secre-
tary, Jack Straw, to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 17 April 2002, 
available at: <http://www.britischebotschaft.delenlnewslitemsJ020418.htm>. 
238. But see: Dianne Otto, supra note 200, at 5-6. (Describing human rights as having devel-
oped in four generations - Otto's view is distinctly the minority view; Otto also describes the usual 
typology of first generation and second generation rights but subdivides third generation rights based 
on whether they arose out of the Soviet Bloc or Non-Aligned Movement.) 
239. Claire Moore Dickerson, supra note 60, at 1441-1442 (describes and refines the three-
generation theory of human rights). 
240. John King Gamble, et aI., supra note 116, at 36 (argues that first-generation rights are able 
to be easily and immediately implemented). 
241. But see: Claire Moore Dickerson, supra note 60, at 1444. Dickerson's ignores the indi-
vidualist propertarian presumptions of first generation rights practice and claims of rights to collec-
tive bargaining which were raised only with the second generation of rights. 
242. John King Gamble, et aI., supra note 116, at 36. 
243. 'The first generation of political and civil rights, embodied in the Universal Declaration 
and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are freedoms from state intrusion: liberti!. The 
second generation furthers realisation of the first generation by guaranteeing minimum standards, 
demandable upon the state, of education and health, a liveable wage, decent working conditions, and 
social insurance for all persons: egalite. Finally, the third generation consists of rights which may be 
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clearly, the Declaration des Droits de l'Homrne of 1789244 did inspire the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).245 The analogy is just 
that, however, an analogy, no more, no less. 
The idea of a triumvirate of rights did not spring, like Athena, fully 
formed from the mind of Zeus.246 It appears to be of rather recent origin. 
Louis Sohn traces the concept of three generations of human rights to 
Karel Vasak of UNESCO, whom Sohn quotes as the source of the 
term.247 Sohn, quoting Vasak, believes that each generation of rights 
complements and completes the other. That, however, ignores the ten-
sion between individual property rights and collective-social rights. One 
can argue that the second-generation rights guarantee the substantive 
social minima precisely to preserve the fIrst-generation property rights, 
namely by maintaining social stability, obviating the need for revolution. 
Be that as it may, Sohn points out that Vasak linked the idea of genera-
tional rights to the motto of the French revolution - liberte, egalite, frat-
ernite. Nothing in the writings of Montesquieu248 or Rousseau,249 or even 
Locke/50 Hobbes,251 or Kant,252 support the theory that human rights 
would unfold in successive generations.253 It seems to be a neologism.254 
In fact, the tripartite typology of human rights is a historical observation 
ex post, not a theoretical framework ex ante. A better typology might 
justify the generational split, not on the basis of history or teleology, but 
rather on positive international law. First-generation international human 
rights appear to be a part of jus cogens.255 Second-generation rights are 
invoked against and demanded of the state. These rights require all the organs of society--individual, 
state, regional, and international--to cooperate in order for the rights to be realised: Jratemite." 
Jennifer A. Downs, supra note 69, at 364. I have found no evidence for this assertion in the writings 
of Diderot, Montesqieu or Rousseau. 
244. Declaration des droits de I'Homme et du citoyen, 26 aoat 1789 available at: 
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/textfondlddhc.htm>. 
245. Die Allgemeine Erkliirung der Menschenrechte, Resolution 217 A (Ill) vom 10.12.1948, 
available at: <http://www.unhchr.chludhrllang/ger.htm>. 
246. ANONYMOUS, ATHENA (2002) <http://www.mythologica.delathena.htm>. 
247. Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 61-62. 
248. Charles Montesquieu, L'Esprit des Lois (1758) available at: 
<http://www.uqac.uquebec.calzone30/Classiques_des_sciences_socialesllivres/montesquieu/de_espr 
it_des_Ioislde3spriCdes_lois_tdm.html>. 
249. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, supra note 172. 
250. JOHN LOCKE, supra note 174. 
251. HOBBES, supra note 20. 
252. IMMANUEL KANT, ZUM EWIGEN FRIEDEN (1795) available at: 
<http://www.mda.delhomes/matbanldelkant-zef.html>; IMMANUEL KANT, BEANTWORTUNG DER 
FRAGE: WAS 1ST AUFKLARUNG? (1784) available at: 
<http://www.gutenberg2000.delkantlaufklaelaufklOOI.htm>. 
253. I am, of course, open to contradiction and do not claim to have read the entire canon of 
every western enlightenment thinker. However, it seems unlikely that the enlightenment thinkers 
foresaw with such clarity the future development of human rights. 
254. Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 61-62. 
255. Jd. at 32. 
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also customary laws, but may be derogated from. Third-generation 
rights are aspirational goals. Each generation is binding, but to a differ-
ent degree and concerns different branches of human rights law. 
Contemporary rights discourse describes human rights as divided into 
three categories. However, that description of rights, and the study of 
rights, is only approximate.256 It ignores certain crosscurrents and ten-
sions between those'rights, and also ignores other evolutionary develop-
ments which are not generally identified in rights discourse. Our histori-
cal and theoretical analysis of the theory of rights reveals the apories in 
the theory in order to resolve them. In conclusion, despite some prob-
lems, the idea of three generations of human rights is, with qualifications, 
a workable, if sometimes only approximate, description of positive law. 
A. FIRST -GENERATION RIGHTS 
The first wave of human rights in modernity is usually identified with the 
period of Scottish enlightenment257 and the age of reason (the nineteenth 
century), expressed in the liberal revolutions258 in America, France, and 
Latin America.259 Rights asserted in these revolutions were essentially 
claims of the individual against state interference and to self-government. 
That is the first-generation rights (e.g., the freedom to worship, to peace-
ably assemble) were negative restrictions on state power.260 First-
generation rights also tend to be procedural rights,261 that is rules which 
256. Jennifer A. Downs, supra note 69, at 351 (argues that the generational theory is metaphoric 
not historic). 
257. R. Randall Kelso, A Post-Conference Reflection On Federalism, Toleration, And Human 
Rights, 40 S. TEx. L. REv. 811,826-827 (two historical strands to moral reasoning about universal 
human rights: the Enlightenment natural law tradition, and the classic and Christian natural law 
tradition) . 
258. [d.; see also, Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 33. Kelso seems to ignore contemporary 
theorists of ius naturale such as Finnis. 
259. Because of this bourgeois influence on the idea of human rights some are sceptical as to 
whether human rights truly "liberates." This scepticism is understandable. Indeed as such critics of 
human rights note, rights are not merely a protection of the weak and innocent against the strong and 
powerful, they are also a vector of state power, and a subtle one at that. See, e.g., Wendy Brown, 
Rights and Identity in Late Modernity, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS AND RIGHTS 89 (Sarat and Keams 
eds., 1995). 
260. U.S. CONST., amend. I (freedom of speech, worship), IV (no unlawful search or seizure), 
inter alia available at: <http://www.law.comell.edulconstitution/constitution.billofrights.htm>. 
261. See e.g., U.S. CONST., amend. V, available at; 
<http://www.law.comell.edulconstitution/constitution.billofrights.htm> and Declaration des droits 
de I'Homme et du Citoyen, arts. 7-9. 
«Article 7 - Nul homme ne peut etre accuse, arrete ou detenu que dans les cas determines 
par la loi et selon les formes qu'elle a prescrites. Ceux qui sollicitem, expedient, execu-
tent ou font executer des ordres arbitraires doivent etre punis ; mais tout citoyen appele 
ou saisi en vertu de la loi doit obeir 11 I'instant ; il se rend coupable par la resistance. Arti-
cle 8 - La loi ne doit etablir que des peines strictement et evidemment necessaires,et nul 
ne peut etre puni qu'en vertu d'une loi etablie et promulguee anterieurement au delit, et 
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determine the creation or application of substantive claims to material 
goods. Another common characteristic of the first generation of rights is 
that, historically, the first generation of human rights tends to see prop-
erty rights as fundamental, individual and even absolute.262 Later genera-
tions see property as relative, and socially conditioned.263 First-
generation rights can be summarised, roughly, as negative civil and po-
litical rights - "freedoms from" rather than "rights to." 
However, describing first-generation rights as negative protection from 
state interference is not entirely accurate. The right to worship as one 
chooses, to write or speak one's rnind,264 are not mere restrictions on state 
power - they are also assertions of the individual's power. Most restric-
tions of state power imply an exercise of individual power and vice 
versa. 
Rights discourse is inherently problematic because of this dual nature of 
rights - every single person's right implies another person's correspond-
ing duty. Rights discourse is inherently problematic because "rights" are 
expressed as vague, or ambiguous, platitudes. Rights discourse is also 
contested because the interest of the individual and the collective are, at 
times, in conflict, and one, or the other, must prevail and because of the 
classic duality265 of "substance" versus "procedure." However, though 
the usual account of the historical development of human rights is not 
perfectly accurate, and though human rights are inherently problematic, 
that does not mean that there is no common concept of an idea that hu-
mans have inherent rights. There is even some agreement as to, at least, 
legalement appliquee. Article 9 - Tout homme etant presume innocent jusqu'a ce qu'il ait 
ete declare coupable, s'il est juge indispensable de I'arreter, toute rigueur qui ne serait pas 
necessaire pour s'assurer de sa personne doit etre severement reprimee par la loi. » 
Available at: <http://www.justice.gouv.fr/textfondlddhc.htm>. 
262. Declaration des Droits de ['Homme et du Citoyen, art. 2, 17, available at: 
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/textfondlddhc.htm>; U.S. CONST., amend. Y, available at: 
<http://www.law.comell.edulconstitutionlconstitution.billofrights.html#amendmentiii>. 
263. E.g. "not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to 
be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960). 
264. E.g., Declaration des Droits de I 'Homme et du Citoyen, art. 10 & II: 
Article 10 - Nul ne doit etre inquiete pour ses opinions, memes religieuses, pourvu que leur manifes-
tation ne trouble pas I'ordre public etabli par la loi. 
Article II - La libre communication des pensees et des opinions est un des droits les plus precieux 
de l'homme ; tout citoyen peut donc parler, ecrire, imprimer librement, sauf a repondre de l'abus de 
cette liberte dans les cas determines par la loi. 
available at: <http://www.justice.gouv.fr/textfondlddhc.htm>. Clearly, these are restrictions of the 
state's power - but they are often also affirmations of the individual's power. 
265. Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony And International Law Speaking Law To Power: 
Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, And The New International Order. I CHI. J. INT'L L. I, 5 (2000) 
(points out the collapse of dualism and that sovereignty rather than a solution to the problems of 
peace and justice is a problem). 
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a common core of universally recognized human rights, such as the right 
not to be deprived arbitrarily of one's own life. 
In sum, despite the historical and methodological limitations, it is possi-
ble to roughly sketch human rights as having passed through three his-
torical stages. However, the usual description must be nuanced, and 
qualified, because that sketch is only roughly accurate. A correct under-
standing of history will, in turn, permit us to develop a correct theory. 
For theory must itself be a reflection of history, i.e. of material reality, if 
it is to be accurate according to materialist epistemology. 
B. SECOND-GENERATION RIGHTS 
The second generation of rights arose during the industrial revolution and 
was contemporaneous with the political revolutions266 of circa 1848-
1870.267 Human rights were then seen, increasingly, as no longer merely 
negative rights to freedom from state interference, but rather as affirma-
tive, substantive268 social claims to state resources.269 Second-generation 
rights were seen as the consequence of dialectical class struggle270 and 
thus, to some extent, as collective rights.271 Second-generation rights 
discourse tends, unlike first-generation rights analysis, to see property 




Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 33. 
Claire Moore Dickerson, supra note 60, at 1444-1445 (describes three-generation rights 
268. E.g., Veifassung der DDR, Artikel 25 ,,(1) Jeder Burger der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik hat das gleiche Recht auf Bildung. Die Bildungsstatten stehen jedermann offen. Das ein-
heitliche sozialistische Bildungssystem gewlihrleistet jedem Burger eine kontinuierliche sozial-
istische Erziehung. Bildung und Weiterbildung." Available at: <http://www.ddr-im-
www.delGesetzeIVerfassung.htm> and at: <http://www.documentarchiv.delddr/verfddr.htmi>. 
269. E.g. Landesveifassung der Freien Hansestadt Bremen Artikel 14: ,)eder Bewohner der 
Freien Hansestadt Bremen hat Anspruch auf eine angemessene Wohnung. Es ist Aufgabe des Staates 
und der Gemeinden, die Verwirklichung dieses Anspruches zu fordem." Available at: 
<http://www.bremen.de/info/skp/lvNrfssngI.htm> . 
270. Prliambel, Verfassung der DDR, 6 April 1968: "In Fortsetzung der revolutionaren Tradi-
tionen der deutschen Arbeiterkiasse und gesttitzt auf die Befreiung Yom Faschismus hat das Yolk der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in Ubereinstimmung mit den Prozessen der geschichtlichen 
Entwickiung unserer Epoche sein Recht auf sozial-okonomische, staatliche und nationale Selbstbes-
timmung verwirklicht und gestaltet die entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft." Available at: 
<http://www.ddr-im-www.delGesetzeNerfassung.htm#sozgesell>. 
271. Landesverfassung der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, yom 21 Oktober 1947 (Brem.GBI. S. 
251). ,,Erschuttert von der Vemichtung, die die autoritare Regierung der Nationalsozialisten unler 
MiBachtung der personlichen Freiheit und der Wurde des Menschen in der jahrhundertealten Freien 
Hansestadt Bremen verursacht hat, sind die Burger dieses Landes willens, eine Ordnung des gesell-
schaftlichen Lebens zu schaffen, in der die soziale Gerechtigkeit, die Menschlichkeit und der Friede 
gepflegt werden, in der der wirtschaftlich Schwache vor Ausbeutung geschutzt und allen Arbeitswil-
ligen ein menschenwtirdiges Dasein gesichert wird." Praambel, Landesverfassung Bremen, avail-
able at: <http://www.bremen.delinfo/skp/lvNrfssngl.htm>. A comparison of the preamble of the 
Bremer constitution and the preamble of the East German constitution reveals several interesting 
equivalences, parallels and divergences. 
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On this point, there is some tension272 between the first and second gen-
eration of rights. For example, the social welfare and social insurance 
schemes273 of industrial states274 and social democracies275 are second-
generation rights - but those rights infringe on the property rights guar-
anteed by first-generation rights. However, while that is the case, the 
second-generation rights also appease the dispossessed and, as such, tend 
to increase social stability. Thus, second-generation rights function ulti-
mately to maintain property rights. 
Not only is there surface tension between the first and second generation 
of rights on the issue of property rights, the usual evolutionary genera-
tional understanding of human rights is incomplete. Are the rights of 
women a first-generation procedural right, a second-generation substan-
tive right, or a third-generation collective right? Historically, claims to 
women's rights only began to be made around 1880, which would place 
them in the second generation. But those claims were to procedural 
rights, such as the right to vote, or freedoms from state restrictions on 
employment and property ownership. So theoretically, at least, the early 
women's rights were first-generation rights - but historically they were 
only recognized just after the rise of the second generation of human 
rights circa 1880. Thus, proponents of the generational theory should 
explicitly declare their description of three generations of rights as either 
theoretical (the author's position), or historical, in order to avoid misun-
derstanding and to clarify the points where history and theory diverge. 
This is not the only example of historical contradiction within the idea of 
human rights. What about the rights of non-whites? Emancipation of 
black persons occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, circa 1860.276 This 
was another claim to freedom from state power - the right not to be prop-
erty, the right to vote, the right to speak. Racial ineqUality was de jacto, 
272. Jennifer A. Downs, supra note 69, at 360-361 (argues, in my opinion, unconvincing1y that 
first and second generation rights live in symbiosis and are not, in fact, in conflict). 
273. E.g., RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1936, art. 120 (right to pensions for the elderly) available 
at: <http://www.departments.bucknell.eduJrussian/constJ36cons04.htmi#chap10>. 
274. Usually social insurance in the liberal democracies is a part of administrative law. Some-
times however it does enter into constitutional law. E.g., art. 41 Bundesverfassung Schweiz: .. I 
Bund und Kantone setzen sich in Erganzung zu personlicher Verantwortung und privater Initiative 
daftir ein, dass: a. jede Person an der sozialen Sicherheit teilhat; ... " available at: 
<http://www.admin.ch/ch/d1sr/lOl/a4I.htmi>.C/. CONSTITUTION FRANCAISE, art. I, available at: 
<http://www.assemblee-nat.fr/connaissance!constitution.asp>. 
275. CONSTITUTION FRANCAISE, 4 Octobre 1958, Article premier « La France est une Repu-
blique indivisible, lai"que, democratique et sociale. EI1e assure l'egalite devant la loi de tous les 
citoyens sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances. » 
276. E.g., The Emancipation Proclamation (1863) available at: 
<http://www.nps.gov/ncro/anti/emancipation.htmi>. 
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and sometimes de jure, well into the twentieth century in the U.S.,m and 
even (with resistance) into the 1980s in South Africa.278 The historical 
description of three generations of human rights must thus acknowledge 
two major incongruencies: the delay in recognizing womens' rights, and 
the denial, at least until relatively recently, of the human rights of non-
whites. 
These instances of historical inconsistencies demonstrate the limits of the 
idea of a "first" wave of procedural negative rights and a "second" gen-
eration substantive affirmative claims. With these qualifications, the 
usual historical account of the evolution of human rights can help us to 
understand why the revolutions of 1776279 and 1789 wrought different 
changes than those of 1917280 and 1949. These tools of understanding 
can be used to indicate whether the discussion concerns the three-
generations theory as an abstract description, where it is roughly accurate 
(with qualification), or as a historical description, where it is only loosely 
accurate. 
C. THIRD GENERATION OF RIGHTS 
The third generation of human rights281 arose in the post-war world. The 
recognition of third-generation rights is sometimes linked to the recogni-
tion of the limited international legal personality.282 Third-generation 
rights are seen as essentially collective.283 They seek to dynamically284 
complement the rights of the first and second generation.285 That attempt, 
277. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (segregated railways not unconstitutional, later 
overruled) available at: <http://afroamhistory.about.coml1ibrarylblplessy_vjerguson.htm>; Cum-
ming v. Board of Ed. of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (segregated education not unconsti-
tutional, later overruled) available at: 
<http://afroarnhistory.about.coml1ibrarylb1cummin~v_richmond.htm>. 
278. For a listing of the principle apartheid legislation and history see BBC, The Story of Africa: 
Southern Africa (2003) available at: 
<http://www.bbc.co.uklworldservicelafricalfeatures/storyofafricall2chapter7 .shtmi>. 
279. For a discussion of the role of revolution in international law (and as expression of the 
right of national self determination) see Theodor Schweisfurth, The Role of Political Revolution in 
the Theory of International Law, in Macdonald & Johnston, supra note 39, at 913. 
280. Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 33. 
281. Jennifer A. Downs, supra note 69, at 362 (citing Karel Vasak, Legal Adviser to the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and former director of the 
UNESCO Division of Human Rights and Peace, as the first to use the term 'third generation human 
rights'). 
282. Comment, Developments In The Law - International Environmental Law: V. Institutional 
Arrangements 104 HARV. L. REv. 1580, 1600 (1991) (notes that individuals have limited rights and 
duties under international human rights law). 
283. Claire Moore Dickerson, supra note 60, at 1445-1446 (describes third generation rights as 
collective solidarity rights). 
284. Jennifer A. Downs, supra note 69, at 363 (third generation of rights a consequence of a 
dynamic view of human rights). 
285. Id. at 358 (describes generational theory of rights). 
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however, is somewhat doomed from inception, because of the inherent 
tension between the individuallpropertarian basis of first-generation 
rights and the collective/social basis of second-generation rights. Despite 
that fact, third-generation rights are said to include the right to peace,286 
the right to security,287 the right to democracy, and the right to environ-
mentally sustainable,288 economic development.289 
Is there anything in the third-generation rights making them inherently 
collective? If so, does that inherent factor mean that individuals should 
not have a cause of action? And, if individuals have a claim for third-
generation rights, is not that claim substantive? It is this author's opinion 
that, while these rights are necessarily collective - peace, democracy, 
and development are not individual phenomena - the enforcement of 
these rights could be placed in the hands of individuals, and linked to 
substantive material goods. In fact, however, the positive force of third-
generation collective rights is contestable, particularly since the fall of 
the Soviet system. Third-generation rights are usually seen as hortatory 
goals which guide and direct the development of the law. 
Because there is some tension between first and second generation of 
rights and a lack of dialogue between third-generation rights and earlier 
conceptions of rights,290 and because of historical inexactitude, the usual 
typology of the three generations of human rights is inaccurate, but not 
so inaccurate that it must be rejected. Instead, the theory must, like most 
theories, be qualified and adapted to conform to reality. It is only where 
reality so fails to conform to a' model's descriptions and predictions, that 
legal science, like any other science, must reject the old model and for-
mulate a new one. That is not the case of the historical account of the 
286. Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, G.A. res. 39/11, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 51) at 22, U.N. Doc. Al39/51 (1984) available at: 
<http://www1.umn.edulhumanrts/instreelq3drpp.htm>. 
287. J. Oloka-Onyango, Human Rights And Sustainable Development In Contemporary Africa: 
A New Dawn, Or Retreating Horizons? 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39,43 (2000). 
288. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights June, 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. 
CABILEG/6713/Rev. 5, arts. 19-24 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982). 
289. 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development. Adopted by General Assembly resolution 
411128 of 4 December 1986, available at: <http://l93.l94.l38.l90IhtmVmenu3Ihn4.htm>. Also 
see, e.g., Isabella D. Bunn, The Right To Development: Implications For International Economic 
Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1425, 1426 (2000) (arguing for "the emergence of the right to devel-
opment."). 
290. The U.S. generally opposes the idea of a third generation of human rights in international 
law. But see Barbara Stark, Economic Rights In The United States And International Human Rights 
Law: Toward An "Entirely New Strategy" 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 130 (1992) suggesting that third 
generation rights in the U.S. are protected at the state level rather than the federal level. That view 
ignores that those claims are generally not defended as inalienable rights but rather are stated to be 
conditional entitlements accorded to individuals by the state as an act of largesse. A conditional 
entitlement must be distinguished from an inalienable right. 
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evolution of human rights through three stages. However, the West-
phalian theory of the state as absolute hermetic sovereign no longer cor-
responds to material reality. Modifying that model is probably impossi-
ble due to fundamental changes in technology. Further, even if the the-
ory could be modified, modification may actually be undesirable if the 
Westphalian model of the state led the world to two global wars. 
The traditional analysis above, that sees human rights as evolving in 
three successive waves, is only partially complete. It is true, very 
roughly, that conceptions of human rights have evolved from individual 
rights to collective claims. It is also true, theoretically, that the rights of 
the individual can be distinguished from freedoms from state interference 
and rights to state resources. However, the three-generation analysis 
ignores certain crosscurrents and tensions between those rights and other 
evolutionary developments not generally identified in rights discourse. 
As such, it can only be used, with these qualifications, as a tool to de-
scribe contemporary reality. 
1. Individual and Collective Rights 
The typical description of human rights is somewhat problematic, and 
requires a shift of focus for better understanding. The generational per-
spective focuses on the content of the right, i.e. the character of the right. 
However, it ignores who holds the right. Instead of asking: "What right 
is held?" ask: "Who holds the right?" A different view emerges when 
the question is "who holds the right?" Having this different view is im-
portant because future rights discourse will probably be characterized by 
a struggle between western/universalist market rights (e.g., the WTO) 
and local, collective, and possibly, fundamentalist conceptions of collec-
tive rights.291 
Just as the contents of rights have evolved with historical development, 
conceptions of who is entitled to claim a right have also evolved. The 
conception of who is entitled to claim a right has evolved from an under-
standing of the holder of legal rights, as the individual, white, male, 
adult citizen, to the holder of rights as including non-whites,292 women, 
and ultimately, non-citizens, children,293 and finally, collectives. This 
291. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, The Embrace of Free Markets, Remarks at the Woodrow Wil-
son Award Dinner of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, New York, New York, 
June 10, 1997. 
292. See, e.g. U.S. CONST., amend. XN. 
293. Thus, radical critiques of human rights as a vector of power are not without foundation. 
See, e.g., Martha Minow, Rights and Cultural Difference, in Sarat and Kearns, supra note 139, at 
355. 
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progress in the ability to hold a right is basically ignored in the tradi-
tional generational view, which focuses on what right is held, rather than 
on who holds the right. This must be pointed out, however, in order to 
escape from the hierarchical, and patriarchical,294 origins of human rights 
seen in Aristotle's thought,295 leading to unjust in.equalities.296 
The idea of women's rights, and rights against racial discrimination, do 
not harmonize well with the generational perspective of rights. Neither 
women's rights, nor the rights of non-white persons, are claims to enti-
tlement, but both women and non-whites were ignored by the individual-
ist first-generation rights theory. Perhaps, this is because these rights, 
though enjoyed by individuals, are derived from collectives - and first-
generation rights are essentially individualistic. In any event, women 
were emancipated relatively late in history - in many cases only in the 
last century, and in some cases, women are not emancipated, most obvi-
ously in the Islamic world,297 but elsewhere as well. Islamic scholars298 
would point out that the right of a woman to seek divorce was first rec-
ognized by Islam, as was racial equality. Islamic feminists would also 
argue that human rights include the right to be treated with dignity and 
respect, and dress codes enforce that respect, and, further, equality of 
rights does not mean equal roles. This author views the historical argu-
ment as more persuasive. Islam clearly assigns specific roles based on 
gender. However, the "liberation" of women in the west should be ques-
tioned, as this "liberation" serves the interests of consumerism and capi-
talism. In the west women are free to be commoditized. Women in the 
west may well have traded the kitchen for the office, yet they still are 
expected to maintain the kitchen.299 
294. See, e.g." ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book I, pt. xm, available at: 
<http://classics.mit.eduJAristotle/politics.mb.txt>. 
295. Aristotle even recognizes that his arguments for natural slavery and the natural inequality 
of men and women are flawed, and tries to meet the objections. Id. at Book I, pI. VL 
296. Aristotle clearly believed that some people were inberently destined for slavery. Id., Book 
I, pI. V., available at: <http://classics.mit.eduJAristotlelpolitics.mb.txt>. 
297. But see, Joelle Entelis, International Human Rights: Islam's Friend Or Foe? 20 FORDHAM 
lNT'L L.J. 1251 (1997). Arguing that Algeria is an Example of the Compatibility of International 
Human Rights law and Islamic law regarding women. 
298. E.g., RIFFAT HASSAN, RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS 
PERSPECTIVES 361-86 (John Witte, Jr. and Johan D. van der Vyver eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1996) available at: <http://www.law.emory.eduJEILR/volumes/spring96/hassan.html>. 
299. For a discussion of Islamic human rights law and international human rights law see, 
Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States And The United Nations Convention On The Elimi-
nation Of All Forms Of Discrimination Against Women: Are The Shari'a And The Convention Com-
patible? 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1949, 1951 (1995). 
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One must also recognize that apartheid was the norm, at least until the 
1950s3°O - well after the beginning of the second-generational social 
rights to substantive goods. It is also worth noting that the rights of sex-
ual dissidents, such as homosexuals,301 transvestites, and transgendered 
persons remain essentially ignored throughout the world.302 Some 
group's rights remain unprotected. 
Because the usual generational perspective focuses on the content of the 
right, rather than who holds the right, it ignores the fact that rights dis-
course is either a reflection of, or reflected in, political theory. But if the 
second and third generations of rights are to be implemented, they re-
quire an interventionist government - exactly the type of government 
that first-generation rights sought to protect against, even avoid. Though 
this contradiction is implicit in the generational perspective on rights, it 
is generally not explicitly stated. Negative "freedoms from" are obvi-
ously incompatible with unlimited government. However, positive 
"claims to" are often incompatible with the idea of limited government. 
So, the tension between different generations of rights also reflects a 
contradiction between forms of government, which in tum depend on 
economic development. This author posits the substantive content of 
rights can only be understood within the economic context in which they 
are deployed. 
2. Property Rights 
Another tension between first and second generation of rights, often ig-
nored by the usual generational perspective, concerns property rights. 
While property rights played a central theoretical role in first-generation 
rights discourse, as both the means and end of the good life,303 and 
though, at least since the fall of the Soviet Union, the practical impor-
tance of property rights has increased, their theoretical role has de-
creased. Today, it is nearly universally admitted that reasonable restric-
tions on property rights are permissible.304 In terms of economic devel-
opment there is no reason for it. Perhaps, the field of human rights is 
dominated by altruists, just as the field of commercial law is dominated 
by practical businesslike persons? If there is legal interpretative flexibil-
300. Population Registration Act 30 of 1950; Group Areas Act 41 of 1950; Separate Represen-
tation of Voters Act 45 of 1951 (Union of South Africa). 
301. But see, Lawrence V. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Dudgeon v. U.K., 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1981). 
302. See, e.g., James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law And Sexual Orientation, 18 
HASTINGS JNT'L& CaMP. L. REv. 1 (1994). 
303. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book I, § 2 (translated by W.D. Ross) (350 b.c.), 
available at: <ilttp:llclassics.mit.edul Aristot1e1nicomachaen.I.i.html>. 
304. This is true even in the United States. See, e.g., U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985). 
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ity in the future resolution of the dialectic between rights as economic, 
negative limitations on government versus rights as positive expressions 
of local and indigenous sovereignty, it may be found here. 
Theoretically, the first generation of human rights was shaped by liberal-
ism, exemplified in the writings of Rousseau,305 Locke,306 and Kant,307 
though rooted much more deeply in the thought of Aristotle.308 The sec-
ond and third generations of rights were in contrast influenced by 
Marx,309 Engels/to Lenin,311 and Mao.312 This raises an implicit question: 
what is the future of rights discourse now that the Soviet Union has col-
lapsed? 
Many theorists, particularly American theorists, regard the end of the 
U.S. S.R. as resulting in a net gain for human rights.313 This is, however, 
not exactly the case. First, Marxist human rights theory assigns survival 
rights, such as food and shelter, a higher value than property rights or the 
right to worship. So, at least from that perspective, gaining the right to 
worship freely and losing the right to a job would be seen as a net loss. 
Furthermore, the economic situation in Russia and the c.I.S. clearly has 
deteriorated severely in the last 10 years314 with a resulting increase in 
305. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL Ou PRINCIPES Du DROIT POLITIQUE 
(1752), available at: <http://www.google.delsearch?q=rousseau+contrat+social&ie=ISO-8859-
I &hl=de&meta=>. 
306. JOHN LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GoVERNMENT (1690), available at: 
<http://libertyonline.hypermall.comlLockeisecondlsecond-frame.html>. 
307. Epistemologically, Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787) (available at: 
<http://www.gutenberg2000.delkantlkrvblkrvb.htm>) is the more important work, though in interna-
tional law Kant is better known for Zum ewigen Frieden (1795) (available at: 
<http://www.mda.delhomes/matbanldelkant-zef.html>). His metaphysics and idealism led him to be 
rejected because only material facts are capable of scientific proof not opinions or subjective states 
of min ct. 
308. "Liberal" is a much abused term, particularly by "neo" "liberals." To understand the origin 
and true meaning of the concept of liberality (and by consequence that "neo-liberal" thought is in 
fact illiberal) see ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book IV Ch. I, supra note 303, at: 
<http://classics.rnit.edulAristotieinicomachaen.4.i v .html>. 
309. Karl Marx, Kapital I. MEW 23, I 89f.309, 183, 789 (1867), available at: 
<http://www.marx-forum.deldas_kapital/kapital_l/inhalCI .html>. 
310. Friedrich Engels, Anti-Diihring, MEW, 20, 95-99 (1887) available at: 
<http://www.mlwerke.delmelme20/me20_00I.htm>. 
311. V.I. LENIN, The State and Revolution, in 25 COLLECTED WORKS, 381-492 (1918) available 
at: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/l917/sep/staterev/>. 
312. MAO TSE-TUNG, On Policy (1940), in 2 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, 441-49 
(Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1965) available at: 
<http://www.marx2mao.org/Mao/OP40.html>. 
313. For an expose and critique of the conventional wisdom see, Scott D. Syfert, Capitalism Or 
Corruption? Corporate Structure, Western Investment And Commercial Crime In The Russian 
Federation, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J.INT'L& COMPo L. 357 (1999). 
314. Shannan C. Krasnokutski, Human Rights In Transition: The Success And Failure Of Polish 
And Russian Criminal Justice Reform, 33 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 13 (2001). 
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crime and decline in human rights.315 Similar regression has also oc-
curred in South Africa. Formally, human rights are better protected there 
because of the legal equality, at least in theory, of blacks and whites. 
However, formal equality is not the same as substantive equality. For-
mal improvement in post-Apartheid South Africa is belied, just as in 
Russia,316 by the rise in crime.317 The situations in Myanmar, Yugosla-
via,318 and Nigeria,319 and Chechnya also belie the idea that, with the end 
of Soviet imperialism, human rights have improved - although perhaps a 
net human rights improvement can be seen, however, in South America. 
What conclusions can be drawn from these facts? 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this author's opinion, rights can only be understood in their economic 
context because rights are ultimately claims to material goods, or deter-
mine procedures by which material goods are assigned. Rights can only 
be scientifically understood when seen as arising out of material condi-
tions because science requires empirical verification of its propositions. 
The fact that the conceptualisation of rights has evolved with economic 
progress corroborative evidence of the theory that rights can only be un-
derstood from a materialist perspective. 
As to the future, the resurgence of property320 and market rights such as 
capital mobility321 and the free movement of labor and goods in the post-
Soviet world322 may be merely a temporary trend. A trend that will con-
315. Louise Shelley, Post-Soviet Organised Crime And The Rule Of Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. 
REv. 827 (1995) ("[o]rganised crime in Russia today is so serious that it threatens human rights, the 
rule of law, democracy, and free markets"). 
316. /d. 
317. Adrien Katherine Wing, The South African Transition To Democratic Rule: Lessons For 
Intenuuional And Comparative Law, 94 AM. SOC'Y lNT'L L. PRoc. 254, 259 (2000). 
318. Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards In The Former Yugoslavia: The 
Case For An International War Crimes Tribunal, 22 DENV. J.lNT'L L. & POL'y 235, 251 (1994). 
319. Sakak Mahmud, The Failed Transition to Civilian Rule in Nigeria: Implications for De-
mocracy and Human Rights, 40 AFR. TODAY 87 (1993); Okechukwu Oko, Subverting The Scourge 
Of Corruption In Nigeria: A Reform Prospectus, 34 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 397 (2002). 
320. See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) (ECHR 4011993/4351514) (1996). 
321. Alfred C. Aman, supra note 42, at 781 (pointing out global capital mobility). It must be 
remembered that prior to 1970 international capital mobility was the exception, not the rule. 
322. Jost Delbruck argues that major changes have occurred in international relations and inter-
national law since 1989 - but that these changes actually affirm sovereignty. Supra note 32, at 705. 
However, Delbruck himself acknowledges both the disintegration of states such as the U.S.S.R. into 
smaller states and more importantly the rise of transnational institutions of governance. [d. at 706. 
The devolution of the sovereign power to other sovereigns cannot be seen as an affirmation of sover-
eignty but is evidence of its transformation. Further the transnational institutions of global govern-
ance clearly affirm the fact that sovereignty has been not only transformed by devolution but also 
transferred by so many derogations that to speak of a rule of absolute sovereignty is meaningless and 
to speak of literally dozens of exceptions to a principle of qualified sovereignty is awkward. It 
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tinue only until the third world objections to capitalism reorganize, pos-
sibly centered around local cultural icons, such as religious fundamental-
ism, e.g. Islamic nationalism,323 liberation theology,324 or some other mix 
of ancient and modem local resistance to a global economic order.325 On 
the other hand, it is also possible that the rise of market rights since 
1989326 could be signalling the return to an understanding of rights in the 
first-generational sense, mere limits on the state's power, or right to con-
strain the market ("freedoms from"), rather than positive claims to sub-
stantive resources ("rights to"). 
Whether the future of rights will continue to follow market trends, or 
reject the market as ultimate judge of right, will depend on whether the 
third world industrializes and escapes the grip of poverty. If it does, then 
a conception of rights as reflections of, or even springing from, markets 
and which, in either case, operate to limit government, will permit the 
west to escape the charge of cultural imperialism or moral relativism, and 
may dominate the discourse of rights for the next few decades. Alterna-
tively, if the third world spirals further into debt and recessions, as seems 
to be the case contemporarily in Argentina327 and Venezuela,328 then we 
may consider the possibility either of a rejection in toto of human rights 
discourse or, more likely, the formulation of cultural particularisms and 
an exceptionalist view of rights such as indicated above. The author 
considers the second the more likely outcome, but both are in fact, possi-
ble. 
The usual tri-partite generational perspective on human rights is only 
partially complete. This is because that classification ignores both the 
economic foundation329 of human rights, and their social expansion to 
cover not only white, male, adult citizens, but also women, persons of 
would be better theoretically to reconceptualize sovereignty rather than to deny empirical reality in 
order to affirm outdated dogma. [d. at 705-706. 
323. For an interesting discussion of the convergence of local tribalism and giobalisation see 
BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD (Times Books, 1995). 
324. See, e.g., Mark Engler, Toward the "Rights of the Poor": Hwruln Rights in Liberation 
Theology, JOURNAL OF RIGHTS AND ETHICS, JRE 28.3: 337-63 (2000). 
325. As mentioned elsewhere the world is developing institutions and processes of global gov-
ernance under law. Ulrich K. Preuss, supra note 113, at 305-306. International institutions such as 
the European Union and the W.T.O. and the U.N. are in fact replacing so many functions of the state 
that, in concert with devolution and privatization, we can meaningfully speak of a shift of state 
power from the nation state to regional global and local institutions of governance. 
326. Some predict that claims that Western ideals are universal will increase because of the end 
of the cold war. See Dianne Otto, supra note 200. 
327. THE ECONOMIST, The Death Of Peronism? Nov. 14,2002. 
328. THE ECONOMIST, When Push Comes To Shove, Dec. 5, 2002. 
329. T. S. Twibell, Ethiopian Constitutional Law: The Structure Of The Ethiopian Government 
And The New Constitution's Ability To Overcome Ethiopia's Problems, 21 LoY. L.A.INT'L & COMPo 
L.J. 399 (1999). 
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color, and even children. The classical typology is incomplete, but does 
help us understand rights discourse, although only partially. We have 
tried to expand briefly upon that theory, since it is roughly accurate his-
torically speaking, and since science contents itself with improving exist-
ing theories and only rejects a previous theory when a new theory can 
better explain observed phenomena. 
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